The Impact of the War on Drugs

on Security, Legitimacy, and Sovereignty in Jamaica:

A Case Study of the 2010 Extradition of Christopher "Dudus" Coke

By

Madeleine Bair

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International and Area Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Percy C. Hintzen, Chair
Professor Alan L. Karras
Professor Michel S. Laguerre

Fall 2011

© 2011
Madeleine Bair

All Rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations... ii

Timeline... iii

Chapter 1: Introduction.. 1
A Review of the Literature.. 2
Outline of Paper... 12
Methodology.. 14

Chapter 2: Jamaica on the Drug Map.. 15
Cocaine & the Caribbean.. 15
Trafficking & Instability... 17
International Drug Policy... 19
Narco-Imperialism.. 21
Adding up the Results.. 22

Chapter 3: An Extradition Request & A Long Delay.................................... 24
The Response.. 25
Why the Resistance?... 28
Capitulation... 31

Chapter 4: The West Kingston Incursion.. 33
West Kingston & Government Relations... 33
Entering Tivoli.. 36

Chapter 5: Epilogue... 41
Human Rights.. 41
Political Fallout... 44
The U.S. Response... 45

Chapter 6: Conclusion.. 49
The Future of Drug Control... 50

Sources.. 54

Chapter Notes.. 57

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BSI	Bureau of Special Investigations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CIFTA	Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOJ	Government of Jamaica
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defence Force
JFJ	Jamaicans for Justice
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
MP	Member of Parliament
PNP	People's National Party
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

TIMELINE

Oct. 25, 2007

U.S. federal prosecutors file charges against Christopher Coke in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, on one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana and one count of conspiracy to illegally traffic in firearms.[1]

Aug. 4, 2009

A U.S. Embassy staff member notifies Commissioner of Police Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin that a request would be made for Coke's extradition on August 25. Lewin calls a meeting with the head of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), Major General Saunders, and the Minister of National Security, Senator Dwight Nelson.[2]

Aug. 24, 2009

Nelson sends Lewin and Saunders to meet with Prime Minister Bruce Golding regarding the charges against Coke.[3]

Aug. 25, 2009

The U.S. Embassy sends the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) a formal request for Coke's extradition.[4]

Aug. 28, 2009

United States prosecutors publicly announce the charges against Coke and the extradition request that they have placed with the Jamaican government. They also unseal the charges against him.[5]

Sept. 10, 2009

Jamaica's Minister of Foreign Affairs Kenneth Baugh meets privately with U.S. Embassy officials to express concern that Coke's arrest could ignite civil unrest throughout the country. The embassy cable describing the conversation states, "his fears are well founded."[6]

Sept. 18, 2009

The Jamaican government requests the U.S. provide additional information to support its the extradition request, including names of witnesses, scientific analysis of the evidence, and a better quality photograph.[7]

The ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) pays nearly US$50,000 to the Manatt, Phelps & Phillips law firm to consult the government in the diplomatic dispute regarding the extradition request.[8]

Oct. 2, 2009

The U.S. Embassy tells the GOJ that further information to support the extradition request should not be necessary.[9]

Oct. 30, 2009

Jamaica's Minister of Justice, Dorothy Lightbourne, contacts the U.S. Embassy. She insists upon the need for further information, elaborating on the administration's concern that wiretapping used as evidence in the extradition request was conducted in contravention of Jamaican law.[10]

Dec. 8, 2009

In Jamaica's parliament, opposition members question the prime minister's delay of Coke's extradition, to which Golding replies that the evidence against Coke was gathered illegally, and that he could not further discuss the matter publicly.[11]

Jan. 27, 2010

Golding meets with an embassy official and suggests that he intends to refuse Coke's extradition.[12]

Feb. 8, 2010

Golding meets again with an embassy official, and inquires whether the U.S. Treasury's "very hard line" in their review of the GOJ's recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan application was related to the Coke extradition matter. The official told Golding that it was not.[13]

Mar. 1, 2010

The U.S. State Department releases its annual drug certification report. The Jamaica assessment states that the country's "unusual handling" of Coke's extradition request "raises serious questions about the GOJ's commitment to combating transnational crime."[14]

Mar. 16, 2010

Golding addresses parliament, denying that the GOJ hired a law firm to consult with Coke's extradition.

May 11, 2010

Golding, under mounting pressure from news reports about the extradition's delay and the engagement of a U.S. firm to consult on the matter, attempts to explain himself in another speech to parliament. He reiterates his administration's belief that the U.S. did not furnish enough evidence. He also states that Manatt, Phelps & Phillips was hired not by the GOJ but by his political party, the JLP.[15]

May 17, 2010

Golding states that he will authorize Coke's extradition, and apologizes to the nation for drawing out the process.[16]

May 18, 2010

Lightbourne signs the extradition request and the government secures an arrest warrant for Coke. Residents erect barricades around his West Kingston neighborhood of Tivoli Gardens.[17]

May 23, 2010

Four Kingston police stations are set on fire, a civilian is killed, and gunfire is heard through West Kingston as security forces attempt to pass roadblocks to enter.[18]

Prime Minister Bruce Golding declares a one-month state of emergency in the Kingston Corporate Area, beginning at 6pm.[19]

May 27, 2010

Security forces raid the home of businessman Keith Clarke in a wealthy Kingston suburb, killing Clarke while his wife and daughter are present.[20]

Police announce that at least 73 people have been killed in the West Kingston operation. This remains the government's final count of civilian casualties during the raid.[*21]

May 28, 2010

A fire in Coronation Market, a large produce market in West Kingston, burns down half the building and forces vendors to leave.[22]

June 4, 2010

Jamaican Public Defender Earl Witter calls on the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to preserve crime scenes in West Kingston and secure weapons used by security forces for ballistic testing so that allegations of abuse can be properly investigated. His calls are unheeded.[23]

June 22, 2010

Parliament votes to extend the state of emergency for another month, and extend it to the neighboring parish of St. Catherine.[24] It also passes six tough-on-crime measures.[25]

Coke is found and arrested outside of Kingston while driving with a sympathetic pastor who says they were en route to the U.S. Embassy where Coke planned to turn himself in.[26]

June 24, 2010

Coke arrives in New York to face charges.[27]

July 22, 2010

The state of emergency comes to an end after the opposition party refuses to grant another extension.[28]

---

[*] A West Kingston resident whose son was taken from her home by soldiers on Sunday, May 30, and killed, was told by authorities that he was not counted in the official tally because they stopped counting after Saturday, May 29.

October, 2010

Golding forms a commission of enquiry to look into allegations of impropriety surrounding the hiring of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips.

June 6, 2011

After three and a half months of hearings, including testimony of top government officials, the commission issues its report, concluding that no misconduct took place in the government's handling of the extradition.

Aug. 31, 2011

Coke pleads guilty in New York to the charges against him.[29]

Oct. 23, 2011

Golding steps down as prime minister more than a year before his term is up. In a national address, he points to the lingering scandal surrounding Coke's extradition delay as one reason he could not continue to govern.[30]

Jan. 17, 2012

Christopher Coke is scheduled to be sentenced to prison.[31]

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 2010, the Jamaican government authorized the extradition of Christopher "Dudus" Coke, don of West Kingston's infamous Tivoli Gardens garrison who was wanted by U.S. prosecutors on charges of drug and guns trafficking. When news reached West Kingston, merchants packed their goods and cleared the streets before nightfall. They knew that what followed would be ugly, and they were right. In the ensuing week, Prime Minister Bruce Golding declared a state of emergency and state security forces fought their way into Tivoli Gardens with tanks and automatic gunfire in search of Coke. By the time they gained control of the area two weeks later, more than 70 civilians—mostly poor, young, black men—had been killed.

The ten-month extradition of a well-known trafficker—nine months during which the prime minister refused its authorization, and one month of a violent nation-wide manhunt—made headlines worldwide. It was scandalous, bloody, and plagued with allegations of corruption at the highest levels of government, and human rights abuses on a massive scale. But this it was not: surprising.

By fate of the same geography that placed Jamaica at the center of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the small island nation now finds itself at the center of a modern criminal trade—mostly of cocaine, but also of ganja and guns. Though Jamaica provides neither the supply of cocaine nor a significant consumer base, it possesses two other factors necessary to the trade: poor citizens willing to join the illicit industry, and a government lacking the capacity to stop them.

Where jobs are scarce and social services wanting, the lucrative transport of drugs fills a vacuum. This is the situation one finds today in West Kingston, and in the slums of many Latin American cities situated along the cocaine corridor, like Lima, Peru, and San Salvador, El Salvador. In Jamaica, employment and earnings from the industry are so thoroughly woven into the political, economic, and social fabric of the country that politicians often take a hands-off approach when it comes to drug trafficking. The term "strongman" is an apt description for known traffickers, whose economic resources and social clout in poor communities exceed that of elected leaders. For the government to enforce drug laws and imprison such dons would shake the precarious foundation on which social stability rests.

Add to this relationship between Jamaica's weak government and "strong" traffickers the United States, whose population constitutes the greatest cocaine consumer base,[32] and whose government provides the bulk of counternarcotics resources. The country's War on Drugs[*] has financed efforts to destroy the supply and interdict the transit of narcotics throughout Latin America and the Caribbean for the past thee decades. When this policy collides with the nexus of drugs, money,

---

[*] In 2009, the director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy announced that the Obama administration would discontinue use of the term, "War on Drugs." However, the change in nomenclature did not reflect any significant change in counternarcotics policy, particularly as pertains to supply-side enforcement efforts. Thus, reference in this paper to the "War on Drugs" simply connotes the broad spectrum of U.S. global drug control policy.

and politics in foreign countries, it can challenge the integrity of that country's democratic institutions and social order, with incendiary results. This is what happened when U.S. federal prosecutors sought the extradition of Coke, Jamaica's most notorious strongman, in August of 2009.

This paper will examine the impact of the drug trade and America's militarized battle against it on security and human rights in inner-city Jamaica. By using the extradition of Coke as a case study, from its roots in U.S. counternarcotics policy and drug trafficking in Jamaica, to the scandal it created in Jamaican politics and the bloodshed its enforcement caused in the capital, it will document how the American government's fight against drug trafficking has manifested as a threat to the security of small drug transit countries.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Research on the impact of drug trafficking and policy on violence in the inner-cities of transit countries falls into two main, yet largely disconnected, areas of study: 1) drug trafficking and the U.S. War on Drugs, and 2) urban marginality and violence in the cities of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Researched War on Drugs

Given the enforcement of drug control on a global scale today, it could be easy to lose sight of the fact that the prohibition of narcotics is, in the words of historian David Courtwright, "a peculiarity of modern times."[33] That is why, when analyzing the mission and methods of the United States' counternarcotics strategy, it is important to locate it within a historical and global context.

As Courtwright documents in *Forces of Habit*, mankind has been experimenting with, producing, sniffing, smoking, and trading narcotics for centuries. Prior to the late 1800s, he writes, the world's governing elites "were concerned with how best to tax the traffic, not how to suppress it. Prohibition would have struck them as futile and wasteful, if they had thought of it at all."[34] The eventual prohibition of some drugs but not others, Courtwright argues, had more to do with economics, politics, and culture, than with any scientific determination regarding their effects.

It is no surprise, then, that laws and cultural norms regarding drug practice vary significantly from one society to the next, as Klein et al. observe in *Caribbean Drugs: From Criminalization to Harm Reduction*. America's "ideal of a drug-free world, with its ideological roots in the temperance movement, revivalist Christianity and the search for an identifiable adversary for the state apparatus"[35] for example, contrasts markedly with the social tolerance of ganja use in Jamaica. "The policy framework provided by the 'war on drugs,'" they argue, "is therefore open to challenge, particularly within the context of a developing country transit zone with a history of culturally validated substance use."

With regulation—of narcotics as well as any other consumer product—comes illicit trade. And like police on the hunt for graffiti artists, the actions of authorities shape those of smugglers and vice versa—a dynamic that Alan Karras chronicles throughout the history of smuggling, particularly in the colonial era. Trading goods outside the regulation of the law dates back centuries, as do the problems this poses to states, such as corruption, violence, and challenges to state legitimacy. In the colonial Caribbean, merchants routinely flouted trade barriers as they trafficked taxable goods to nearby islands, putting to the test the authority and enforcement capacity of fragile young governments. Those governments' inability to stop the flourishing trade of contraband, argues Karras, "clearly revealed the state's weakness."[36] He paints a picture of smuggling as a tug-of-war between the state's desire to demonstrate power and authority and the citizens' desire to gain individual control. Deborah Yashar, writing on the modern drug trade, explains that in weak states, both the state and the smugglers negotiate the terms of this contract. "Where rule of law is far from certain, the illicit economy reflects and can re-shape the relationship between states and citizen," she writes. "Accordingly, politics is not confined to formal and informal institutions but is also defined by the illicit, the complicit, and the cross-border."[37] Illicit trafficking, in other words, can delineate the nature of government itself.

Because smuggling was so rampant in the colonial Caribbean, Karras writes, and paying taxes on tradable goods so unpopular, authorities faced a difficult choice of either attempting, with limited success, to implement their taxation or prohibition laws and gain revenue but earn the ire of citizens, or to ignore their laws, lose revenue, but maintain allegiance of their citizenry. Oftentimes, they earned legitimacy by choosing the latter route. "In doing so, government deprives itself of revenue to which it is otherwise entitled; it gains, however, at least theoretically, in its subjects' esteem."[38] In rare situations in which the state did choose to intervene to stop smuggling, "one almost certainly might expect that a great deal of international pressure has been brought to bear on it to do so."[39] Government authorities enforced smuggling laws more to gain legitimacy in the eyes of international powers than to gain legitimacy among their own citizens—a pattern that we will see repeated in the implementation of drug policy in the Western Hemisphere today.

Legitimacy comprises a major theme in the literature on American counternarcotics policy. The vast trove of writing on the topic includes scholarship and policy papers, human rights reports, and even drug mule narratives.[40] The majority of research focuses on Colombia, which has long been the largest producer of cocaine and greatest recipient of U.S. counternarcotics funding.[*] As Marlyn Jones wrote in 2002, "despite a plethora of drug policy literature focusing on source

---

[*] This is changing, as Peru is close to edging out Colombia as the world's top coca producer, according to the UNODC's September 2011 Illicit Crop Monitoring report on Bolivia. At the same time, American counter-drug assistance to Colombia is declining, while assistance to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean has increased since the Mérida Initiative began in 2008, according to Seelke et al., p. 11.

countries, little if any information currently exists on drug policy consequences at transit points,"[41] a statement that remains true today.

President Richard Nixon declared a "War on Drugs" in 1971 amidst rising street crime and reports of drug addiction among U.S. soldiers and veterans returning from Vietnam.[42] But it was not until the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s that Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush imposed a series of strict domestic policies targeting drug use in America, and simultaneous foreign policies to cut supply among the coca-growing countries of the Andes and transit countries of Central America and the Caribbean.

Adam Isacson describes this shift in policy as the militarization of drug control—a shift that continues to drive U.S. drug policy three decades later.[43] The focus on supply-side enforcement vastly broadened the reach of foreign drug control efforts. Today, America's counternarcotics strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean is carried out by way of the U.S. military, USAID, foreign trade policy, and other military, economic, and diplomatic channels.[44] From 1980 to 2009, this added up to roughly $14.6 billion.[45] The majority of this aid goes to military and police forces of source and transit countries, which the U.S. provides with both equipment like firearms, helicopters, and maritime vessels, and training by the U.S. Armed Forces.

Accompanying this policy shift by Reagan was a change in the rhetoric surrounding the War on Drugs, which was now couched within the framework of American security rather than substance abuse. President Obama's new counternarcotics initiatives, for instance, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and Central American Regional Security Initiative, do not use the word "drug" in their title but rather, "security." Marketed and explained within such a security framework, the War on Drugs now falls into step with America's long history of intervention throughout the region justified in terms of security—a history that that dates back to the Monroe Doctrine.[*] For proponents of this strategy, like influential policy hawk Ivelaw Griffith, if the United States did not provide military assistance throughout the Western Hemisphere to battle drug trafficking, it would leave the region vulnerable to what Barbadian Prime Minister Stanford once called "the single most critical security challenge to the region."[46] Thus, suggests Griffith, the Monroe Doctrine gives the United States a mandate to intervene in foreign countries to combat drug trafficking.

For critics, though, the War on Drugs represents not a necessary fight for security but rather the latest in America's history of neo-colonial interventionism in Latin America. As Rachel Neild writes, this history includes invasions of Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Nicaragua, after which the U.S. helped build "constabulary-style police forces in these countries."[47] Many analysts argue that the more recent imperative to intercept cocaine before it reaches U.S. shores has provided justification to maintain a formidable U.S. military presence and influence

---

[*] The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which declared the interests of newly independent Latin American nations to be the interests of the United States, has been invoked by presidents and diplomats throughout modern U.S. history as justification for intervention throughout the region.

in the region, needed when the threat of communism—its previous raison d'être—faded with the fall of the USSR.[48] Rather than being motivated by drug control, this reasoning suggests, the War on Drugs is a pretext for the assertion of American military and political hegemony throughout the region.

Like U.S. intervention in Latin America during the Cold War, military and political intervention employed in America's War on Drugs can create a crisis of political legitimacy in foreign countries. Jürgen Habermas argued that capitalist societies are doomed to face a crisis of legitimacy when their constituencies see the contradiction between the promise of a democratic state and the reality of a government more responsive to some actors than to others. State policies derive their legitimacy from transparency, public discourse, and truth, he posited. The imposition of U.S. counter-drug imperatives on legislation and law enforcement in other countries, in a process that bypasses and often usurps citizen democracy, generates the conditions for such a crisis. The War on Drugs challenges both the legitimacy and sovereignty of source and transit countries in multiple respects.

The first—the ineffectiveness of drug control—recalls the same crisis faced by weak colonial regimes that Karras documented. While it is impossible, given the illicit nature of the commerce, to derive accurate statistics on cocaine trafficking, most studies have found America's counternarcotics strategy to be a failure in accomplishing the mission of decreasing the supply and increasing the price of cocaine. Reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have shown that coca eradication in one country is often accompanied by an increase in production somewhere else.[*,] Likewise, when interdiction efforts improve in Central America, trafficking increases in the Caribbean, and vice versa. (Both are examples of the so-called "balloon theory" of drug policy, which will be discussed further in chapter two). Write Beruff and Cordero, "No evidence exists of a significant, sustainable, reduction in the quantity of drugs flowing through the Caribbean."[49] This indicates that, like colonial governments unable to secure their borders from smuggling, foreign militaries and police tasked by the U.S. to intercept drugs have proven incapable of doing so. Platzer et al. argue that this inability to control what enters their borders "erodes each state's claim to its own territory" and, in effect, "erodes the notion of national sovereignty."[50]

Secondly, the dependence of American rather than domestic security forces to enforce laws and "protect the security" of foreign nations poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of foreign states. Beruff and Cordero write that with the militarization of counternarcotics strategies, "Caribbean countries feared that the drug war agenda would give US military forces undue influence over their own small and poorly funded security forces."[51] In fact, Elliot Abrams, a high-ranking official in the Reagan administration, argued that U.S. security concerns "in our

---

[*] The U.S. State Department and the UNODC each compile annual estimates of coca cultivation and production. Both show, over time, little significant change. See a comparison of their data by the Washington Office on Latin America: http://justf.org/node/1641; This is also the conclusion drawn in "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs," which summarizes of the War on Drugs that "efforts have done little to reduce the overall availability of illicit drugs in the United States." P. i.

proverbial backyard" might require Caribbean nations to relinquish their sovereignty to allow the U.S. to assume "its role as the ultimate guarantor of peace, stability, and nowadays, democracy," in the region.[52] The War on Drugs, in other words, would require smaller countries to forfeit their self-governance to the militaristic and economic might of the United States. As we will see below, Caribbean leaders have contested such perceived threats to their sovereignty, but the terms of the War on Drugs as defined by the United States give small nations little recourse to assert their claims.

Thirdly, the War on Drugs challenges the sovereignty and legitimacy of foreign countries by imposing policy that is, in the words of Platzer et al., "not the result of local consensus on the issue but foreign intervention,"[53] While American presidents have promoted the War on Drugs as a war to protect the security of the region, Axel Klein argues that "the security discourse tends to gloss over the ideological character of the prohibitionist policy espoused by the U.S. government."[54] Rather than perceived universally as a policy to promote security, U.S. counternarcotics policy is often controversial and highly contested in foreign countries, but one important component of the War on Drugs—the drug certification process—effectively coerces them to implement it anyways. Every year, the U.S. State Department publishes its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), in which it reviews the progress of drug producing and transit countries in their efforts to combat drugs. In practice, a country's progress is judged by its cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics strategies, such as coca crop eradication, joint maritime patrol, or drug extradition cases. An unfavorable review can result in the restriction of aid, the delay of trade agreements, and the denial of international loans. This controversial process is used to compel the cooperation of foreign countries in the War on Drugs, and gives the United States immense leverage to dictate the drug policy of foreign countries.

Because of the drug certification process, if the citizens and politicians of a country oppose U.S. counternarcotics strategy, their hands are effectively tied due to the economic repercussions that would result from a failure to do so. Neild offers the example of coca eradication, a drug control method promoted by the U.S. government and highly controversial in coca-growing countries.[55] Though the Bolivian public was adamantly opposed to coca eradication, its elected president, Sanchez de Lozada, chose to implement it lest not suffer the reproach and financial retribution of the United States. Because of his apparent responsiveness to the interests of the United States over those of his own citizens, in 2003 he was forced out of office, illustrating Habermas's "legitimation crisis" as generated by the War on Drugs. The president of Peru faced the same crisis. In response to massive opposition, he halted coca eradication, only to restart it when American officials informed him that such action would prevent the country from benefitting from a regional trade negotiation.[56] When politicians are more accountable to the foreign policy interests of a super-power than to their own citizens, there is a crisis of legitimacy, sovereignty, and democracy.

The final aspect of the legitimacy crisis that U.S. counternarcotics policy poses in Caribbean and Latin American countries can be found in the increasing violence in the region that analysts attribute to the drug trade and enforcement

efforts against it. "Drug-induced proliferation of firearms has expanded governance problems in Caribbean societies" note Platzer et al.[57] In Jamaica, for instance, drug trafficking provides gangs (known there as "posses") with funding for stockpiles of arms. As criminals amass heavy weaponry, they are able to challenge the state security forces, resulting in inner-city warfare not only between rival posses but also between police and residents. The ability of citizens to match the weaponry of state security forces raises the question of who can lay claim to legitimate use of force. "Lacking other investigatory and legal powers," write Platzer et al., Jamaican police "have turned to massive violence as an allegedly effective method to control poor neighborhoods."[58] This is how, in many drug producing and transit countries, as Klein writes, "the tail began wagging the dog."[59] That is, armed drug traffickers rather than state authorities began to call the shots on what laws would be enforced and how.[*] It was this drug-funded violence that led the head of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) in 2003 to declare transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, a threat to his country's democracy and way of life.[60]

While many observers have noted the increase in drug trafficking and violence in cities throughout the Western Hemisphere, the connection between the two phenomena is more often assumed than explained. Very little research analyzes the dynamic between America's War on Drugs and violence in source and transit countries. However, a growing body of sociological research on urban marginality in the developing world, with a particular focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, sheds light on the factors at work in these environments.

The Researched 21st Century Slum[†]

In 1996, Loic Wacquant wrote of "the rise of advanced marginality"—a new degree of severance of the urban underclass from the rest of society. While Wacquant's laboratory was the American ghetto, scholarship soon followed documenting similar phenomena in Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and elsewhere.[61] What makes this marginality, these "hyperghettos," as Wacquant has called them, distinct from that of the past is a sense of isolation—from society, from the job market, from one another.

The rise of advanced marginality observed in each of these cities has accompanied the rise of neo-liberalism. This was particularly true in Latin America, where the 1980s and 1990s witnessed debt crises followed by structural adjustment programs that disrupted the economic and social order of much of the

[*] Perhaps the most dramatic and well documented example of this is the case of "los Extraditables," a group of Colombian drug lords who in the 1980s used violent intimidation to keep the legal authorities of that country from using the full weight of the law to capture, charge, and extradite them to the United States.

[†] Use of the term "slum" here follows its broad definition as used by the United Nations in its 2003 report "The Challenge of Slums," which encompasses the global phenomenon of marginalized urban or peri-urban areas, including what is known in more specific contexts as "ghetto," "favela," or the Jamaican "garrison."

continent.[*] "None of the phenomena of urban informality," writes Nezar AlSayyad, "can be understood outside the context of globalization and liberalization."[62] Javier Auyero describes a shantytown in Argentina where jobs in the manufacturing industry were eliminated and replaced by part-time service work if any work at all. At the same time, the social safety net was largely eradicated, leaving the urban poor with no stable source of income nor security of housing, health care, or retirement pension. Dozens of developing countries in the Americas, including Jamaica, underwent such economic reforms.[63]

The result was that communities that were once stable, if extremely poor, lost their stability when their jobs vanished. In Latin America today, even a full-time job pays barely enough to survive,[64] and so the bulk of economic activity takes place in the informal sector—from legal labor like street vending, recycling, and repair work, to illicit hustling like car theft and drug dealing. It was an economic and social shift that directly contributed to the rise of drug trafficking in urban slums throughout the Americas. Though Wacquant described the "hyperghettos" of the United States as economically severed from the rest of society, such a framework is not applicable to the slums of Latin America, where drug trafficking fills the economic vacuum. Rather, by entering the global informal economy of illicit trafficking, these communities, while socially alienated from society, are more intensely linked to domestic politics, international policy, and the global economy than ever before.

In *Demeaned but Empowered*, a rare examination of Jamaican garrisons, Obika Gray documents this process as it played out in the slums of Kingston, within the context of the developing Jamaican political structure. Many of these communities, including Tivoli Gardens, began as improvised settlements of rural migrants. Local politicians realized that, though poor, these impoverished residents possessed one valuable resource: votes.[†] Thus began a complex patronage relationship, in which political loyalty was proffered in exchange for housing and other direly needed infrastructure. In the newly independent Jamaica, such valuable commodities were bestowed or denied at a high price. Units at the new Tivoli Gardens apartments were denied for those supporting the opposition party, and political loyalty in the 1970s was enforced at gunpoint by foot soldiers of the political parties. Garrison residents were at once socially alienated from the rest of society and at the same time integral to it, providing critical voting blocks for rival political parties.

In the 1980s, however, this relationship underwent a shift triggered by structural adjustment and the attendant presence of the drug trade in the country. Indebted to international lending institutions, Jamaican politicians faced international pressure to sever ties to the garrisons. At the same time, because of

---

[*] Structural adjustment programs, or SAPs, refer to the set of loan conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, including, most significantly, privatization of industry, contraction of government, and trade liberalization.

[†] In *The Other Path,* Hernando de Soto describes a similar process at work in the squatter settlements of Lima, Peru, where, in exchange for votes, politicians offered the communities recognition and services that the state had previously denied.

the government's economic woes, they lost the financial resources critical to those clientelistic ties. "With the contracting fortunes of the national economy during recession and structural adjustment, the opportunities for largesse were constricted," writes Klein. "At the same time neighborhood groups… were discovering new fortunes and with it independence in the drug trade."[65] With the country in an economic crisis, political patronage was supplanted by the illicit economy, and drug traffickers became the new patrons of the garrisons. "A lively international traffic in hard drugs now complemented the island's modest export trade in marijuana," Gray writes. "And this change in the illicit trade hastened the displacement of pure partisanship as vocation and source of livelihood in the ghetto."[66] What we find now is a parallel authority—one of organized criminals—that provides for the community what the government, political parties, and society does not.

Marlyn Jones calls this process the evolution from what is known in Jamaica as "political tribalism" to "narco-tribalism." Jones' scholarship is among the few to examine the impact of the drug trade and the U.S. War on Drugs on Jamaican garrisons. "In the past, political tribalism and the culture of violence were used to explain increases in Jamaica's crime and violence. Several sources now posit that trade in guns and hard drugs have replaced political tribalism as primary causes of Jamaica's crime," she writes in "Policy Paradox: Implications of US Drug Control Policy for Jamaica." Jones argues that numerous aspects of U.S. policy contribute to violence in Jamaica, including the shipment of guns from the United States, the deportation of Jamaican nationals, and ever-stricter enforcement efforts which have led to the "feminization" of drug trafficking, by which female drug mules slip drugs in small quantities across borders. With Jamaica at a hub of the international cocaine market, American drug control strategies have only resulted in an escalation of crime and violence in the country.

While the fields of sociology and anthropology have contributed to our understanding of the informal and illicit economies of the 21st century slum, political scientists have taken a more empirical look at the dynamic between drug control policy, law enforcement, and violence. In their analysis of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Burma, Snyder and Martinez analyze the relationship between states and organized criminals, concluding, "illegality does not necessarily breed violence…. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to improve law enforcement, can lead to violence."[67] This research is corroborated by recent UNODC reports that explain that the dismantling of large drug cartels will not necessarily reduce violence and may, in fact, produce the opposite effect.[68] This research into the complex and perhaps counterintuitive dynamic between drug control and violence will aid our analysis of the Coke extradition process. There, we will find, American counternarcotics policy conflicted with the state-sponsored protection racket that had allowed for a sense of stability amidst illicit activity in the garrisons. Such a conflict leads to the question of who defines security and who wields the reigns of power within the context of the global War on Drugs.

Furthering the Research

The research of Jones and that of Snyder and Martinez notwithstanding, existing literature on drug policy and urban violence in the developing world neatly divides into two separate categories, with little overlap. The first concerns drug trafficking and modern enforcement efforts—led and financed by the United States—against it. The second concerns increasing levels of violence, drug trafficking, and social marginalization among the urban slums of Latin America. In the second category, despite an observed correlation between violence and drug trafficking, there is still little empirical research into the impact of counternarcotics policy—as opposed to merely drug trafficking—on such communities. This examination of the extradition of Christopher Coke seeks to begin to fill that hole by connecting the dots between the War on Drugs and violence in a Jamaican garrison.

Though lacking in scholarly analysis, the relationship between U.S. counter-drug policy and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean is hardly without precedent. As noted above, many analysts have traced the lineage of the War on Drugs to America's military and political intervention in the region during the Cold War. American funding of the 1973 coup d'etat of Chile's President Salvador Allende and of the Nicaraguan contra militia, to name two examples of Cold War intervention, share many important traits with current drug control in the region: a priority of military funding and training over diplomatic and development aid; use of U.S. hegemony to dictate the domestic politics of foreign countries; massive violence, and allegations of human rights abuse by state authorities.

One difference is that without the political salience of the purported threat of communism, ongoing U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere is less analyzed and observed today. This is particularly true since the "War on Terror" has shifted the focus of American diplomacy and foreign media coverage to the Middle East. As we shall see, the lack of attention should by no means be interpreted to signify a decline of U.S. intervention. In fact, justified by a continuing War on Drugs—and the more recent assertion by U.S. policymakers that fighting drugs is critical to fighting terror—American intervention in Latin America continues as much today as ever before.

Several factors make this a compelling time to analyze the foreign impact of the War on Drugs. Since the 1980s, critics have argued that America's strategy of targeting supply and transit countries is the wrong way to curtail drug use in the United States.[*] However, only recently have such opinions gained traction among political elites. "It is time to think again about the War on Drugs," Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos told a British newspaper shortly after taking office in 2011,[69] becoming the second sitting president of a Latin American country, after Mexican President Felipe Calderón, to suggest the legalization of drugs. Both pointed out the violence that the 30-year-old counternarcotics approach has inflicted on their countries.[70] The Global Commission on Drug Policy, which includes

[*] Critics have said the same about the simultaneous domestic counternarcotics strategy—the imprisonment of petty drug dealers in U.S. cities—an issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.

former presidents of Mexico and Colombia, former United Nations commissioners, and American economists, has used empirical research to support its call for an end to the War on Drugs.[71] In a widely circulated op-ed in June 2011, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter cited the Commission's reports to make the same appeal.[72]

Two current political developments lend momentum to such calls and give urgency to the need for more scholarly analysis of the unintended consequences of the global drug war. The first is the wave of violence in Mexico following President Calderón's decision to crack down on major drug traffickers in Mexico. Since late 2006, when newly elected Calderón launched a police and military offensive against drug cartels, violence has escalated even as major traffickers have been killed or arrested. After approximately 46,000 murders since the strategy began,[*] current polls show that Mexicans are frustrated by their own country's war on drug trafficking.[73] Media attention to the mounting violence just across U.S. borders has thrown a spotlight on the violent consequences of a militarized strategy of drug control.

The second political development is the current focus in Washington on cutting federal spending—a focus that has led many to scrutinize the efficacy of foreign aid programs. In June 2011, when Congressional researchers reported on increasing funding for counternarcotics contractors in Latin America, Democratic Senator Claire McCaskill expressed indignation at such profligacy. "We are wasting tax dollars and throwing money at a problem without even knowing what we are getting in return," she told the *Los Angeles Times.*[74] Whether this sort of criticism within Congress will result in real legislative change or simply represents the political winds of the moment is yet to be seen. Regardless, politicians as well as taxpayers funding the War on Drugs deserve to know what it is they, and other countries, are getting out of the dubious 30-year-old strategy.

While there are great academic and political needs for this research, perhaps the most pressing imperative has to do with issues of human rights and sovereignty. The extradition of Christopher Coke resulted in the deaths of at least 74 Jamaican civilians[†] and allegations of widespread abuse committed by Jamaican security forces. An official inquiry into what has come to be known as the "West Kingston incursion" will not take place without political will, and that is unlikely to be found in Jamaica, whose prime minister at the time, Bruce Golding, resigned without ever having opened one. The imperative to pursue answers and accountability for those deaths, however, rests not only on the shoulders of Jamaicans. For years, the United States has dictated counternarcotics strategy in the region without paying for the consequences, from the displacement of farmers in Colombia to the political opposition to coca eradication in Peru, or the violent response of cartels to

---

[*] Because of the high levels of violence, the tally of homicides in Mexico changes rapidly. The figure of 46,000 is from the government's estimate of 35,000 between 2007 and January 2011, and estimates from Mexican media of 11,000 homicides in 2011.

[†] The government's official count of civilians killed during the "West Kingston incursion" is 73. The author documented one additional death not included in that count, and Jamaica's Public Defender Earl Witter has said the number is probably much higher than the official tally.

government pressure in Mexico. While it may have been Jamaican security forces involved in the West Kingston violence, it was American drug policy they were enforcing. Given the inordinate delay in authorizing the extradition, the Jamaican government clearly would not have undertaken such a strategy on its own, and without American counternarcotics aid, it may not have had the means to do so anyways. The fact that it did, under much pressure from the U.S. government, puts at least some of the burden to understand and explain the fatal consequences of Coke's extradition at the doorstep of U.S. legislators. However, if the pieces of the story are never connected, if the civil unrest in West Kingston is only viewed through the framework of Jamaican garrisons and politics, rather than within the context of U.S. policy, then America can continue to deny its responsibility.

This paper intends to tell the story of a singular event in America's counternarcotics strategy in its full narrative, so that the conclusion cannot be separated from the genesis, the results are analyzed hand in hand with the policy. In doing so we will argue that, as exemplified in Jamaica, the American War on Drugs imposes a "crisis of legitimacy" in small drug-transit countries, undermining their democracy, their sovereignty, and their ability to uphold security and human rights.

OUTLINE OF PAPER

The reason the extradition of Christopher Coke offers so much insight into the complex dynamics of U.S. counternarcotics policy is that every step of the process unleashed a dilemma, each revealing one more flaw in the premise or strategy of the War on Drugs. This paper will chronicle the cascade of unintended (yet unsurprising) reactions that the extradition request set off, pulling them apart one by one to understand the connection between one and the next, the first and the last.

To understand Coke's extradition, we must first grasp the geopolitical environment in which the process took place. As most accounts of drug trafficking and policy focus on Colombia and, more recently, Mexico, chapter two will examine the place of the Caribbean, and Jamaica specifically, in both the drug trade and U.S counternarcotics policy. The argument is introduced, and pursued throughout the paper, that while drug trafficking itself is framed as a threat to security by the authors of counternarcotics policy, enforcement in source and transit countries often poses just as great, if not greater, a threat to security than the illicit trade itself.

Nine months elapsed between the extradition request for Coke, filed at the end of August 2009, and Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding finally, and reluctantly, signing off on it. The request and that long delay, sternly criticized by U.S. officials, is the subject of chapter three, which will explore the many questions the delay raised, including: What is the nature of the relationship between the government of Jamaica and Christopher Coke? How does the Jamaican government collaborate with—or rebuke—the United States and its counternarcotics agenda? Who holds the reigns of drug enforcement in Jamaica, and how is this power negotiated? In sum, why did it take the Jamaican government nine months to agree to arrest the country's most notorious drug trafficker? In answering these questions, we will begin to comprehend the threat to both security and sovereignty that U.S.

drug policy poses on the Jamaican government as it grapples with an extradition whose enforcement, it has good reason to believe, will lead to social unrest.

The disconnect between the explicit goal of counternarcotics policy—security—and its common consequence—massive civil upheaval—was exemplified by the incursion by security forces into West Kingston once the government authorized Coke's extradition in May 2010. The prime minister's declaration that the state would seek to arrest Coke triggered marches and barricades in the Tivoli Gardens community, a two-month state of emergency, and allegations of massive human rights violations by state security forces. In chapter four, we will contextualize the incursion by analyzing the roots of unrest in West Kingston and the community's complicated relationship with both its strongman and state authorities. As the state of emergency and crackdown on crime continued long after Coke's arrest in late June, this section will also chronicle the breadth of the Jamaican government's actions in the context of the extradition, and the allegations of abuse of power that continued throughout the summer.

After a month-long manhunt, Coke was found and sent to New York, where he remains in jail a year and a half later, awaiting a January 2012 sentencing hearing for the trafficking charges to which he pled guilty. In that time, both Jamaican society and U.S. officials have had their chance to address the scandals that Coke's extradition process involved. These include the suggestion of collusion between Prime Minister Golding and a known trafficker, the affront by a small country to U.S. drug policy, and the allegations of massive human rights violations by Jamaican security forces. Chapter five will analyze the fallout from the extradition process. In Jamaica, the government carried out a farcical enquiry into Golding's delay in authorizing the extradition request, but no investigation into the West Kingston incursion. In the United States, there was official approval of the Jamaican authorities' capture of Coke, and silence on the allegations of human rights abuses. The way that both countries responded—or not—to such scandals provides further insight into the priorities of the War on Drugs and its impact on Jamaican security.

By chronicling the extradition of Christopher Coke from the drafting of U.S. counternarcotics policy to the aftermath of the civil unrest it provoked, this study will, in conclusion, take stock of the role of U.S. policy on security and human rights in Jamaica. After considering the destructive impact that Christopher Coke's extradition had on human lives and political stability in Jamaica, we will seek to examine what, if anything, Coke's extradition achieved towards the purported goals of America's War on Drugs. Using its long history of failure as a guide, we will argue that rather than effectively controlling the transnational flow of drugs, U.S. counternarcotics policy undermines the sovereignty of foreign nations and maintains oppression of the marginalized urban poor in developing countries of the Western Hemisphere. With a view towards a U.S. administration that has pledged to its neighbors to work collaboratively to address drug trafficking, we will conclude with an assessment of President Obama's reforms. Do they offer something new? Do they incorporate the concerns of source and transit countries? Is major reform of drug policy, such as that suggested by the current presidents of Colombia and Mexico, even feasible in today's political climate?

METHODOLOGY

This study will utilize a variety of data to paint a comprehensive picture of the extradition process. By employing critical interpretive methodology, we will interpret the chronology of the process within the framework of American counternarcotics policy. Facts, figures, and first-person testimonies on the subject are complicated by the illicit nature of drug trafficking and the nebulous character of the global War on Drugs. We will attempt to overcome this challenge by weaving together several sources rather than relying on just one. For example, figures from international organizations such as the UNODC tabulate the changes in drug trafficking over time, offering one barometer by which to measure the efficacy of the War on Drugs. Government documents including congressional testimony and sub-committee reports shed light on the U.S. government's philosophy and policies regarding drug trafficking (however, it must be noted, many counter-drug operations are difficult if not impossible to pin down due to the fact that some U.S. counternarcotics funding and appropriations are classified or funneled through broad military and State Department initiatives.[75]). Backroom discussions described in leaked diplomatic cables intimate the real reasons behind Jamaican officials' reluctance to issue a warrant for Coke and the pressure U.S. officials put on them during the extradition process. The public responses from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Justice to Coke's extradition illustrate how the U.S. government perceives its role in the extradition and its fatal repercussions. Jamaican news accounts and government reports during and after the extradition process offer a Jamaican perspective of both the prime minister's handling of the extradition request and the violence that broke out in the wake of his authorization. Coverage in the Jamaican media of hearings into the extradition, in which top members of government testified, constitute one more document of the political dynamics at work in this international affair.

Additionally, the author spent three months in Jamaica in 2010 immediately following the West Kingston incursion, and primary and secondary source data gathered there yield an intimate sense of the brutality inner-city Jamaicans experienced during the hunt for Christopher Coke. Documentation from this period includes testimony of residents who witnessed the incursion and experienced abuse by the security forces. Together with first-hand observations of West Kingston under the state of emergency and open-ended interviews with the Jamaican public defender and a leading human rights advocate, this data will provide the most comprehensive account to date of the May 2010 incursion into West Kingston.

These various pieces of information—from international reports and diplomatic cables to news articles and eyewitness accounts—will be woven together to tell the story of Christopher Coke's extradition. By examining both American policy and Kingston's violence in tandem we will understand how, in this particular case, the War on Drugs imposed a threat to security, human rights, and state legitimacy in Jamaica.

CHAPTER 2:
JAMAICA ON THE DRUG MAP

On a Thursday morning in late May of 2010, the U.S. State Department gathered officials from 15 Caribbean countries around long wooden tables in a Washington conference room. The goal of the daylong meeting was to realize the promise that President Barack Obama had given at the Summit of the Americas a year earlier—the "launch a new chapter of engagement" with a region that had felt sidelined since the War on Terror.[76] This new chapter, the dignitaries in Washington would now learn, centered on a regional counternarcotics program, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

The launch of the CBSI could not have come at a more portentous time. As Attorney General Eric Holder spoke to the room about the need for a joint effort to battle drug trafficking, the capital of Jamaica was under siege as security forces hunted down notorious strongman Christopher Coke to face U.S. federal trafficking charges. For the Caribbean leaders gathered in Washington, news reports of gun battles on the streets of Kingston illustrated a problem much greater than Jamaica. It was, in fact, a scene many had dealt with before.

"Wedged between the world's source of cocaine to the south and its primary consumer markets to the north," states a 2007 UNODC and World Bank report, "the Caribbean is the transit point for a torrent of narcotics, with a street value that exceeds the value of the entire legal economy."[77] In the past 25 years, the emergence of cocaine trafficking has created a situation of lawlessness, corruption, and violence that small Caribbean countries have struggled to address, unequipped as they are to enforce international narcotics policy on their own. Their relative lack of resources has given the United States great leverage to impose and enforce its own drug control strategy in the region. Thus, policies to combat trafficking in the Caribbean, with their citizens' lives, their economies, and their political stability at stake, are written in Washington and funded by U.S. taxpayers. While global in scope, counternarcotics policy is by no means a product of international diplomacy.

So it was that the latest regional counternarcotics strategy was unveiled by U.S. officials in Washington, far from the developing countries and urban centers most afflicted by drug trafficking and its concomitant violence. The strategy that U.S. government officials unveiled to Caribbean leaders last May, with its focus on military and police funding, deviated little from the counter-drug initiatives of past administrations. It is unclear if a new influx of military training will make a dent in the flow of narcotics in the region, or provide residents of the most murderous region of the world with greater security.[78] After all, similar efforts in the history of the U.S.'s War on Drugs have done neither. By most accounts, in fact, they have done more harm than good.

COCAINE & THE CARIBBEAN

It is impossible to separate the modern drug trade from enforcement efforts against it. They work as a single dynamic, a move by one precipitating a response by the

other. And so, to understand how the small island nation of Jamaica became a nexus of the international cocaine trade is to understand not only the trade itself, but the dynamics of America's War on Drugs.

Cocaine's trade route begins in the Andean region of South America. Coca is harvested in the hillsides of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, and processed into a paste. Submarines, fishing boats, human organs, and commercial jets transport the cargo across Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, where traffickers adulterate the product with an assortment of chemical additives before it reaches the U.S. market.

In a 1982 speech, President Ronald Reagan made clear the imperative of interdiction abroad that would form a key component of his War on Drugs. "We must mobilize all our forces to stop the flow of drugs into this country," he declared, upon signing an executive order greatly expanding the nation's counternarcotics programs.[79] Since then, American drug control efforts have spread their reach to the entire supply chain and transit route of cocaine. Operations range from aerial eradication of Andean coca fields to maritime patrols throughout the Caribbean Sea and the prosecution of both powerful and petty traffickers. This adds up to approximately $1 billion annually in grants and loan obligations to Latin America and the Caribbean to fight drug production and trafficking.[80]

Despite the vast resources the U.S. government employs in the War on Drugs, it has failed to significantly curtail the flow and use of narcotics. According to the UNODC, demand for cocaine has waned slightly in the United States in past decade, but has risen elsewhere, and "despite radical changes within countries, total cocaine output has been fairly stable over the last decade."[81] In other words, U.S.-funded initiatives to destroy coca at the source or interdict cocaine in transit barely make a dent in global trafficking of the drug.

This stubborn supply of cocaine means that drug policy enforcement alters not the *amount* that is trafficked, but the methods and routes that traffickers employ. If enforcement changes in one region, it will inevitably lead to a reciprocal change in the supply or distribution in another—a phenomenon known as the "balloon effect." The term usually refers to cocaine production. For example, while Colombia's coca harvest has decreased in recent years—a development the U.S. attributes to the success of its aerial and manual eradication operations[82]—a simultaneous increase in production in neighboring Bolivia and Peru has nullified any broad impact of that progress.[83]

The balloon has proven just as apt a metaphor in the dynamic of trafficking. Prior to the 1990s, a handful of Colombian criminal groups dominated the cocaine trade. "In the 1980s, most of the cocaine entering the United States came through the Caribbean into the southern part of the state of Florida," states the UNODC's 2010 World Drug Report.[84] But when Colombian authorities arrested, killed, or extradited the leaders of major cartels, the change made room for newer and smaller trafficking groups, space that was rapidly filled by Mexican criminal organizations.[85] Mexican cartels preferred to navigate Central America, and law enforcement followed, with crackdowns by security forces trained and funded by the U.S. military. Traffickers, in turn, explored routes with less enforcement, which is how the Caribbean—a region of hundreds of islands, small governments, and plenty of unguarded coastlines—has found itself to a greater or lesser extent

throughout the past 30 years at the center of the War on Drugs. The metaphorical balloon is in a perpetual state of transfiguration in response to the ebbs and flows of counternarcotics enforcement.[86]

Estimates of the fraction of cocaine that traverses the Caribbean vary widely based on the year and the source, and have declined in the past decade due to the increasing dominance of Mexican cartels. In 2000, an estimated 11 percent of U.S. supply went through Jamaica. In 2005, just two percent did, and two years later, the share was down to one percent, with 90 percent of cocaine headed for the United States estimated to travel through Central America.[87] Still, for a small, poor country, the dividends of the trade are considerable. In 2009, Jamaican police seized a total of 264 kilograms of cocaine, worth a U.S. street value of nearly $46 million, or 14 percent of the value of Jamaican exports to the United States.[88]

TRAFFICKING & INSTABILITY

"If you're gonna get into a business here, this is it."
- Spanish Town funeral home employee[89]

While research shows a drastic decline in the flow of narcotics through the Caribbean in the past decade, security in the region during that time has only deteriorated. The link between violence and trafficking is complex, and the mantra of the War on Drugs that cracking down on trafficking will result in greater security has proven false.

One thing is clear: the cocaine corridor is one of the world's most violent regions. Of the seven most murderous countries in the world, all but one are located in the Caribbean or Central America.[90] And few countries suffer from violence more than Jamaica, with 52.1 homicides for every 100,000 citizens, a murder rate 73 percent higher than the regional average.[91] The U.S. State Department characterized Jamaica's violence in 2009 as reaching "civil war levels."[92] While Caribbean countries would not score so high on other indices of violence such as political conflict or ethnic cleansing, the soaring murder rate is a powerful indication of the drug trade's impact on the social fabric of the region.

While drug trafficking is by no means the only explanation for the region's violence—other factors include the legacy of civil warfare in Central America in the 1980s, and armed political rivalries in Jamaica that date to the 1950s—its contribution is undeniable. The United Nations identified drug trafficking as "the root cause of the surge of homicides in Central America in recent years." While news reports of Coke's extradition have focused on his drug trafficking charges, he was also charged with arms trafficking, as are many alleged drug traffickers extradited from Jamaica.[93] The interconnected trades, by which profits from drugs provide Jamaican posses with funds to purchase firearms from abroad or from domestic security forces,[94] have facilitated easy access to heavy weaponry in Jamaican cities. It is not uncommon, in garrison communities, to see groups of teenage boys walking through the streets with automatic rifles hanging from their shoulders.[95]

The correlation between drug trafficking and violence, however, is not always a direct or obvious one.[96] That is to say, a decline in drug trafficking will not necessarily lead to greater security. "Violence often escalates when an existing status quo is broken," states the UNODC's 2011 Global Study on Homicide. As cocaine trafficking is pushed from one region to another, as the figurative balloon changes shape, one can expect an increase in violence even in regions experiencing a reduction in drug flow. The report continues:

> From available evidence it appears that higher levels of violence and homicides are not only associated with increases in drug trafficking flows, but also with decreases in drug flows that lead to turbulence in established markets, more competition between criminal groups and more killings. It is therefore likely that changes in drug markets drive lethal violence, not overall levels of trafficking flows per se.[97]

Thus, while the Caribbean has seen a major decline in drug trafficking as the bulk of cocaine moved to the Central American transit route, it has simultaneously experienced a steady increase in homicide rates.

Drug trafficking not only contributes to high levels of gun violence, but to the risk of political instability. "Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM* countries than the drug problem," states a 1992 report by the West Indian Commission, "and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more."[98] In explaining the link between drug trafficking and destabilization, the UNODC's 2010 World Drug Report states that "the small size of the local economy relative to the value of the drug flow" is one relevant factor. The $88 billion global cocaine market[99] eclipses the gross domestic product (GDP) of all CARICOM countries combined.[100] Traffickers often have far more resources at their disposal than domestic law enforcement and political institutions.

The tremendous power of drug traffickers—in terms of both financial resources and firepower—relative to state institutions fuels a system of political corruption in the region. If poorly paid officers of the JDF can turn an easy profit by selling weapons to drug posses, as Gunst chronicles in *Born Fi' Dead*, they will. "Illicit drugs," states a 2009 U.S. Congressional report, "create enormous financial power that allows traffickers to corrode government institutions."[101] In 2010, 137 members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) were barred from reenlisting and 71 were arrested and charged on the basis of corruption.[102] As we will see in chapter three, the perception that Christopher Coke had paid Jamaican politicians for protection from arrest pervaded the local reaction to the Coke extradition process.

* CARICOM (an acronym for Caribbean Community) is a regional body focused on coordinating economic and foreign policies among Caribbean nations and serving as a unified economic market for many of its member states.

INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY

The lack of local capacity to enforce international drug policy and expel known traffickers is factor used by proponents of the War on Drugs to justify the intervention of U.S. policy and enforcement strategies throughout the hemisphere. "All Caribbean nations," wrote Ivelaw Griffith in 1993, "have recognized that individual efforts are insufficient to meet their security needs."[103] The U.S. State Department explains its involvement in Jamaica's drug control policy and enforcement operations this way:

> Because it operates under severe resource constraints, the USG* and other donor assistance is essential if the GOJ† is going to develop and sustain counter-drug/crime capability. U.S. counternarcotics assistance seeks, through the provision of equipment, technical assistance and training, to help the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), Jamaica Customs, and other GOJ agencies reduce the flow of illegal drugs from Jamaica to the United States."[104]

There is not space here to catalogue all the ways that the United States funds and directs counternarcotics policy abroad, nor would such a task be practical, given how numerous, disperse, and in some cases, classified, such operations are. What follows is an overview of the most critical ways that drug policy and enforcement in Jamaica is directed by foreign actors, particularly the United States government. These include bilateral and multilateral agreements, military assistance, foreign assistance, economic aid, and the annual drug certification process. Between the international treaties dictating drug control in Jamaica, and $1 million in annual counternarcotics funding from the United States, Jamaica's battle against drugs is arguably one fought without Jamaicans at the helm.

Multilateral Agreements

International narcotics treaties guide much of the way Jamaica regulates drugs and enforces such policy. These include the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention, all of which regulate drugs and prohibit trafficking; the UN Convention against Corruption, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.[105] In implementing its drug control agenda, the U.S. often uses these multilateral agreements as justification to coerce the cooperation of reluctant foreign governments, as we shall see below. Many other agreements Jamaica has signed were not products of international consensus but of America's War on Drugs. For example, Jamaica's extradition

* United States government
† Government of Jamaica

agreement with the United States was written by the Reagan administration as a part of its counternarcotics policy. "The Treaty," Reagan wrote to Congress when he sent it for approval in 1984, "will facilitate United States efforts to prosecute narcotics conspiracies."[106] When President George H.W. Bush sent to congress the 1991 Jamaican Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty—allowing for collaboration in criminal matters—he wrote that it would "assist in the prosecution of a wide variety of modern criminals, including members of drug cartels."[107]

The association between drug trafficking and crime, and, more recently, terror, is often cited in U.S. counternarcotics legislation. The FY2012 foreign aid budget summary, for example, repeatedly invokes the terms "terror" and "rule of law" in justifying its $1.5 billion International Narcotics Control budget request.[108] The State Department's 2011 drug certification of Jamaica indicates a clear concern for not only drug trafficking but domestic crime as well, when it states that "gang-led violent crime and corruption will continue to pose a significant threat to social stability in Jamaica and the region. We encourage the GOJ to increase its collaboration with the USG and other regional partners, to adopt the proposed comprehensive anti-gang law, and to maintain and enhance its efforts to detect, prosecute, and punish corruption." Within the framework of the War on Drugs, the U.S. government gives itself license to not only dictate regional drug policy, but to mandate the domestic crime policy of foreign nations as well.

To Caribbean and Latin American governments, such policy mandates are often seen as a threat to their sovereignty. In 1998, Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr. of Antigua-Barbuda wrote to President Reagan on behalf of several Caribbean countries to rebuke "attempts to extend domestic United States authority into the neighboring countries of the region without regard to the sovereignty and independent legal systems of those countries."[109] Throughout the War on Drugs, foreign countries have protested policies that contravene the will of their citizens and political leaders. But as we shall see below, the economic and political dominance of the United States is exercised as an essential tool in its counternarcotics strategy to force the cooperation of foreign governments.

U.S. Counternarcotics Enforcement Strategies

Treaties provide international agreement on drug control, but the ability to enforce them requires resources that few countries in the Caribbean possess. Thus, not only does the U.S. government write the bulk of international counternarcotics policy; through numerous channels of financing, it underwrites the law enforcement strategies necessary to back it up.

As noted in chapter one, U.S counternarcotics policy in Latin America follows in the footsteps of American counterinsurgency efforts against communism in the region, and like the Cold War, the War on Drugs prioritizes military strength as its tactical strategy. The bulk of U.S. counternarcotics aid to the Caribbean goes to military and police training and equipment and military contracting. Such initiatives include the participation of U.S. military and law enforcement officers in foreign operations—a relationship that would be difficult to imagine in the reverse (e.g.

Jamaican soldiers accompanying the FBI to close an illegal gun shop in Arizona). Over the past several years, the Department of State, under the objective of "achieving peace and security," has gradually increased counternarcotics aid to Jamaica. This amounted to $992,000 in FY2008, $1,010,000 in FY2009, and a request for $1,610,000 for FY2010 to "enhance law enforcement to detect and intercept shipments and detain traffickers…. and improve law enforcement through modernization and professionalization of the Jamaica Constabulary Force."[110]

To offer a few examples of how this financing is put to use, in 2009 U.S. military institutions trained 125 Jamaican personnel in skills ranging from marksmanship to counter-terrorism and naval patrol.[111] American forces conducted maritime operations with the Jamaican coastguard; and a unit of U.S. Marshals permanently stationed in Kingston trained a specialized fugitive apprehension unit of the Jamaican police.[112] In 2010, the U.S. government licensed the sale of more than $2.7 million of weaponry to Jamaica, including firearms, ballistic missiles, and naval vessels.[113]

In addition to federal counternarcotics assistance, the U.S. government exercises political and economic hegemony to fight its War on Drugs, especially when foreign leaders resist American counter-drug policies. A 1980s amendment to ever-harsher drug control legislation was the requirement that the U.S. government "certify" foreign countries' counternarcotics cooperation in the State Department's annual INCSR. Governments that fail to satisfy State Department officials face disciplinary action that can include restricting U.S. aid and trade benefits and vetoing loan requests to multilateral lending institutions. As an illustration of just how much American financial aid that Jamaica, like other developing countries, relies on, the State Department provided more than $13 million to the country in 2010, including military, economic, government, development, and civil society assistance.[114] The threat of rescinding those dollars, or of vetoing crucial loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is a stick powerful enough to galvanize submission to U.S. policy, as we shall see below.

NARCO-IMPERIALISM

"At the heart of drug control lays a balance
between individual rights and the demands of society.
Laws arise from social custom to regulate the intercourse of individuals and groups.
In the course of imperialism, however, the laws and customs of ruling groups
were imposed upon conquered populations."
- Axel Klein[115]

For the United States to direct, finance, and enforce its global counternarcotics agenda throughout the hemisphere at times requires, as Elliot Abrams stated, that Caribbean nations relinquish their sovereignty. The policies that drug transit countries are forced by the U.S. to implement are often counter to the will of their citizens and not in the best interest of the country's security, economy, or stability. For example, in 2000 the Jamaican government appointed a commission to study

domestic marijuana policy. Eight months later, the group of distinguished experts recommended decriminalization, based on cultural traditions, inequities of justice, and the destructive societal impact of massive criminal behavior and imprisonment.[116]

Despite a decade of discussion since the recommendation, including support for the commission's findings by Jamaican medical organizations,[117] its implementation has been stymied due to the threat of a U.S. backlash. "The U.S. administration opposes the decriminalisation of marijuana use," a U.S. embassy spokesperson told the *Jamaica Gleaner* in what the paper described as a "terse response" to queries about the commission's findings.[118] "The U.S. Government will consider Jamaica's adherence to its commitments under the 1988 UN Drug Convention when making its determination under the annual narcotics certification review," the spokesperson said. The response was interpreted as a threat by the State Department to decertify the country in its INCSR if Jamaica implemented the Ganja Commission's recommendations. Jamaican leaders feared sanctions would result, "including the withdrawal of most United States foreign assistance, as well as opposition to loans from multinational development banks, particularly the United States."[119] Such economic sanctions would devastate the country. Jamaican lawmakers must accept that the policies they enact prioritize the interests of the U.S. government over those of their own people.

Another initiative that has pitted American counternarcotics policy against foreign sovereignty in the Caribbean is the Shiprider Agreement,* which permits U.S. personnel to patrol the territorial waters of another nation as long as they are accompanied by security forces of the host nation. The U.S. Coastguard, for example, could conduct missions in Jamaican waters as long as Jamaican officials are on board. For many Caribbean nations, including Jamaica, the idea of U.S. security forces patrolling their own territory posed a direct threat to their sovereignty. But through promises of financial aid, American economic hegemony once again succeeded in coercing their agreement.[120]

ADDING UP THE RESULTS

After decades of U.S. counternarcotics policy at work in Jamaica, it is important to add up the results, especially at a time when the United States is launching a new regional counter-drug strategy. But how does one measure success in the War on Drugs?

The purported goal is to curtail drug use in the United States by halting supply at the source and interdicting it during transit. Success, in theory, would lead to increased price and decreased consumption.[121] As we have seen, measured by these goals, the War on Drugs by most accounts has borne no tangible result. American officials also cite security as a primary motivation for counternarcotics policy. However, security in the Caribbean has deteriorated, despite massive U.S. funding of its military and law enforcement institutions.

---

* Officially called the Maritime Counternarcotics Cooperation Agreement.

The continuation of the same strategy despite its failure on both of these benchmarks of success leads one to question whether the War on Drug is about drugs or security at all. Instead, like the Cold War before it, drugs provide a nebulous enemy that justifies and legitimizes sustained U.S. political and military intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. A 1989 congressional presentation by a Pentagon official suggests the real reason for such legitimized intervention. Explaining the rationale for security assistance to Jamaica, the presentation stated, "Security assistance can contribute towards achieving our objectives of maintaining a stable democratic government friendly to the United States, maintaining close cooperation in preserving regional stability, and furthering cooperation in marijuana eradication and narcotics interdiction."[122] It is hard not to conclude that the primary motivation for U.S. counternarcotics policy is to support American political interests region-wide.

****

As the saga of Christopher Coke's extradition will reveal, the problem with America's War on Drugs is not only its failure to curtail drug trafficking and resulting criminal behavior, but the conflict that it creates when the conditions of domestic power collide with the hegemony of U.S. drug policy. Anthropologist Don Robotham captures this crisis in a letter to the *Jamaica Gleaner,* in which he describes the dynamics at work at the nexus of cocaine, violence, and politics:

> Sections of West Kingston have become a major axis of the international cocaine trade from Colombia to London and elsewhere… my sense is that the relationship between these 'dons' and their apparent political mentors is a rather tense one, suffused with mutual distrust, liable to explode (in which direction?) at any moment! Who is using whom in this dirty game?
>
> Wherever such 'dons' are to be found, you will find such weapons. What the cocaine 'dons' demand from their political connections in return for their support, is 'cover' from raids by the security forces. This issue of the provision of 'cover' from the police is becoming an increasingly critical matter for the operations of these 'dons', because our security forces are naturally under immense pressure from anti-narcotics forces worldwide to crush the hard drug trade at its point of origin in sections of these communities, before the crack gets into Europe, the USA or Canada.[123]

It is a gripping account, but what is most elucidating about it is the dateline: July of 2001. The same words could have been published in *The Gleaner* a decade later, as the conflict Robotham describes was played out during the extradition of Coke—a don thought to have political cover, but stripped of it due to pressure from the United States. After a decade of U.S. counternarcotics policy, it is difficult to identify any improvement in the environment of drug trafficking and violence, corruption, and international policy that Robotham described in 2001. The conflict remains.

CHAPTER 3:
AN EXTRADITION REQUEST
& A LONG DELAY

The U.S. federal indictment charging Christopher Michael Coke of cocaine, marijuana, and guns trafficking lists eight different aliases he used—among them, "Presi," "General," "Duddus," and "Shortman," and he played just as many roles in Jamaican society. As the scion of one of Jamaica's first drug lords, and don of the West Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens, Coke wore the hats of a thug, community leader, and CEO. But to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), an arm of the Justice Department, he was among "the world's most dangerous narcotics kingpins."[124] The extradition and prosecution of high profile traffickers like Coke is a key component of the War on Drugs.[125] And so, in late August of 2009, U.S. prosecutors called for his extradition from Jamaica to face trial in the Southern District Court of New York.

By the time the extradition request landed on the desk of Jamaica's Attorney General Dorothy Lightbourne on August 25, news of the impending request had already circulated through the country's chambers of power. In fact, politicians were aware of the possibility at least two years earlier, when U.S. prosecutors filed criminal charges against Coke.[126] Within days of the 2007 indictment, Prime Minister Bruce Golding himself met with the U.S. ambassador to discuss the matter.[127]

Closer to the extradition request, the Golding administration was alerted by way of diplomatic channels. In early August, Jamaican Chief of Police Hardley Lewin was told by an acquaintance in the U.S. embassy that the request would be conferred within weeks. Lewin immediately met with the head of the military, Major General Saunders, and Prime Minister Golding. Given the rush of meetings among administration appointees, and the series of emails, phone calls, and backdoor discussions regarding the matter well before it became public, the prospect of Coke's extradition clearly caused great concern among Jamaica's political leaders.

None of this advance warning, however, gave the Golding administration enough time to prepare. Its response, which included a legal rebuttal, political lobbying, and backdoor diplomacy, reflected not a coordinated strategy, only a stubborn opposition to Coke's extradition. For the next nine months, the administration used all the resources within its power to prevent it.

Though many have accused such stalling tactics as evidence of corruption, the government's concern about extraditing Coke was far more complicated than the protection of a JLP supporter. Jamaica's leaders had many reasons to believe that arresting Coke would lead to a collapse of law and order.

The delay of Coke's extradition threatened Jamaica's relationship with the United States, and lingering accusations of corruption eventually led to Golding's resignation. The entirety of the repercussions will not be known for years to come, but one thing that the government's grappling with the request made clear is the grave crisis that U.S. drug enforcement poses upon foreign nations. In deciding how to respond, Jamaica's leaders were forced to weigh America's drug policy—a policy premised on the mantra of security—against the security of its own people.

THE RESPONSE

The Jamaican government responded to the request for Coke's extradition with legal argumentation, diplomatic pleas, and political lobbying, all intended to prevent or indefinitely delay its execution. This was an unusual reaction, as extraditions are fairly routine in Jamaica. In 2010, the country extradited nine other citizens to the United States besides Coke, all without incident. In this case, however, the Golding administration utilized all its resources to contest the request.

Legal Argument

According to the terms of the U.S.-Jamaica extradition treaty, an extradition request served from one country to the other must include documents describing the alleged offense and evidence supporting the charges. If such documents satisfy the requested state, that state must use its authority to apprehend the alleged criminal. If not, that state must promptly explain its reasons for denying the extradition.

The first sign that Coke's extradition would not proceed as usual was a resistance to "promptly" do anything about it. The authority to approve or deny the extradition fell under Attorney General and Minister of Justice Dorothy Lightbourne. But as Chief of Police Lewin recounted later, Lightbourne appeared to be in no hurry to take action. She seemed annoyed, a colleague told Lewin, "over the push to initiate extradition proceedings against Coke… The document, she had been informed, is in order," Lewin was told, but "she is making a fuss as to the undue haste to sign the document."[128]

In mid-September, Lightbourne responded to the U.S. Embassy, requesting more information from U.S. prosecutors to support their request, including names of witnesses, scientific analysis of the evidence, and a better quality photograph than the one provided.[129] A month after the U.S. Embassy stated that further information was unnecessary, Lightbourne repeated her request, and explained her concern that evidence prosecutors had provided was gathered illegally.[130] Specifically, the Golding administration argued that an unknown rogue police officer had passed information collected by wiretap to Americans without going through the proper channels of authority, thus breaching Jamaica's Interception of Communications Act.

While the Golding administration has maintained that argument to this day, many have called the reasoning dubious, beginning with the U.S. State Department, which dismissed the allegation of illegal wiretapping as "unfounded."[131] In a diplomatic cable dated December 3, 2009, an Embassy official wrote that "in Post's estimate, this is a delaying tactic: Coke's power in Tivoli Gardens and elsewhere in the country, and influence over Prime Minister Bruce Golding's ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), are deeply entrenched."[132] Lewin, who stepped down as Chief of Police in November 2009, told the press the following May that the officer in question conducted the operation "with the full knowledge and approval of his chain of command."[133] Even more, Lewin referred to the officer as "Constable Red Herring," an apparent jab at the prime minister, suggesting that Golding's argument

of illegal wiretapping was a way to detract attention from the trafficking charges against Coke.[134]

Others claimed that the evidence against Coke was collected in the same manner as that of other extradition requests that Jamaican officials authorized without a hitch. Jeremy Taylor, who heads the Extradition Unit in the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions office in Jamaica, testified later that Lightbourne herself had previously signed an extradition request furnished with similar evidence.[135] Furthermore, he maintained that the evidence gathered in Coke's case did not breach Jamaican law and was indeed admissible in court.

Diplomacy

While the government's official response to the extradition request was a denial based on a claim of illegally gathered evidence, Jamaican officials also used diplomatic channels to press their objections. The private conversations that took place reveal more about the government's true concerns with the extradition than its public and official responses.

A week after Jamaica received the extradition request, an official of the U.S. Embassy in Jamaica typed a confidential cable to Washington with the subject line, "U.S. request to extradite powerful 'Don' presents government with a dangerous dilemma; Kingston Mayor warns of 'severe repercussions.'"[136] The memo describes a meeting requested urgently by Kingston mayor Desmond McKenzie, in which the mayor explained the "serious crisis" that the extradition request presented for the government of Jamaica.

> He predicted that there would be "severe repercussions" and "collateral damage" if Coke were arrested, and that this would "risk destroying everything the Government was trying to do on the economy and crime." The Mayor said that in recent years his administration had worked with Coke to reduce crime in the inner cities of Jamaica, particularly in West Kingston. If he now were extradited, this would "leave a vacuum," and matters would be much worse. McKenzie noted that in recent days several of his "contacts in the communities" had told him they "would not take this (Coke's extradition) lying down."

McKenzie asked "if there were any room for further discussions with U.S. officials," to which they replied "that the U.S. expected Jamaica to honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, and considered this a case of great importance."

Many such backroom conversations took place between Jamaican political leaders and U.S. Embassy staff, even while officially the Golding administration pursued a legal argument against the extradition. Among those to meet with embassy officials were the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kenneth Baugh and first lady Lorna Golding. Along with Kingston Mayor McKenzie, all of them expressed concern that Coke's arrest could ignite civil unrest throughout the country.

It is important to note that throughout this time, Jamaica was enmeshed in a fiscal crisis. Government revenues were in decline, the fiscal deficit was growing at twice the rate of the previous year, and drawn-out discussions with the IMF regarding Jamaica's application for a loan caused further concern among the country's private sector.[137] That is why perhaps the most revealing backroom conversation to take place during Coke's extradition delay was the one at the prime minister's office on February 9, 2010. "PM Golding began the conversation," the confidential embassy cable reads, "by expressing his understanding that the U.S. Treasury reps had taken a 'very hard line' in their review of the Government of Jamaica (GOJ)'s recent IMF loan application by insisting on strict adherence to all of the terms of the loan. He asked if this 'hard line' stance was related to the GOJ's inaction on the Coke extradition matter." The official assured the prime minister that it was not. Whether or not that was true, Golding's concern that his response to Coke's extradition request could have a bearing on the country's precarious economic standing illustrates the utility of American political and economic hegemony in enforcing the policies of its War on Drugs. While the embassy official told Golding that the two were unrelated matters, the pattern of America's enforcement of its drug control policies—particularly the disciplinary methods of the drug certification process—gives foreign governments reason to fear that their resistance to U.S. drug policy can damage their finances and economy. When such a country is small and poor, such a threat—whether real or perceived—is all the more influential in coercing cooperation with U.S. policy.

Political Lobbying

With the U.S. State Department dismissing the legal argument against Coke's extradition and rejecting diplomatic pleas to negotiate, the Golding administration hired an American firm to lobby in Washington on its behalf. This move proved to be the most controversial of the government's responses, igniting a political firestorm that would eventually lead to Golding's capitulation in authorizing the extradition.

According to Golding, the JLP paid the New York law firm, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, nearly $50,000 in mid-September 2009. In a long explanation of the arrangement the following May, Golding stated that he did so "knowing that such interventions have in the past proven to be of considerable value in dealing with issues involving the governments of both countries."[138] It was a controversial move for many reasons. First of all, many perceived it as an audacious example of protection for a wanted drug trafficker by no less than the Jamaican government itself. Golding insisted, however, that the firm was hired not on behalf of the government but on behalf of the JLP. But this was thrown into doubt when the firm itself claimed to represent the Jamaican government—a statement that Golding said resulted from a misunderstanding. He insisted that it was not his administration which provided the funds but rather party supporters. Yet Golding's refusal to name the donors fueled speculation that Coke himself paid for the firm's services. Little is known of what the firm actually did to lobby U.S. lawmakers against the extradition,

but anything it may have done was certainly neutralized by the controversy it generated in Jamaica.

****

None of these efforts pursuaded American officials to revise or reconsider their extradition request. All they accomplished was to create a scandal within Jamaican politics and civil society, and threaten the relationship between the two countries. While Jamaican officials were clearly frustrated by the extradition request and the U.S. government's unwillingness to negotiate, American officials also expressed disdain for the government of Jamaica's response. That can be discerned in the State Department's 2010 drug certification of Jamaica, included in the annual INCSR. "The GOJ's unusual handling of the August request for the extradition of a high profile Jamaican crime lord," states the country assessment, "marked a dramatic change in GOJ's previous cooperation on extradition… and raises serious questions about the GOJ's commitment to combating transnational crime."

WHY THE RESISTANCE?

So why the delay? Why did the Golding administration risk so much political capital, threaten its relationship with the United States, and invite charges of collusion with an alleged international narco-trafficker? In attempting to answer these questions, one must probe the reasons the Golding administration gave—publicly, but most importantly privately—for the need to prevent the extradition, which requires an understanding of the relationship between the government and Christopher Coke.

The Corruption Charge

The relationship between the ruling JLP and the Coke family spans generations and administrations.[*] As a member of parliament, Bruce Golding, like his predecessors Edward Seaga and Alexander Bustamante, represented the West Kingston constituency of Tivoli Gardens, a constituency that Coke could just as well claim as his own. Murals along Spanish Town Road in the heart of the district depict portraits of the Golding and Seaga families, as well as graffiti naming "The Prezident," or "Dudus," expressing loyalty for both the district's elected and illicit leaders.

Prime Minister Golding first met Christopher Coke, he has recounted, when he was first elected MP for West Kingston in 2005. "He was a benefactor," Golding explained. "He was typical of what is called Dons, wielding considerable amount of influence and being held in significant esteem."[139] They met several times thereafter, as Coke was not only a "Don" and community leader but also a businessman with government contracts that helped provide jobs for local residents.[140] In the embassy

[*] This history is documented most comprehensively in Laurie Gunst's *Born Fi' Dead: A Journey Through the Jamaican Posse Underworld*.

cable regarding the meeting with Kingston Mayor McKenzie shortly following the extradition request, the official provided background about this relationship for the benefit of the cable's Washington recipients:

> In the island state's tribal political culture, over the years both major parties have developed symbiotic ties of patronage and influence with the "Dons" who control the garrison communities, and whose powers have grown as Jamaica's economy has struggled. Coke's gang provides social and welfare services and turns out the JLP vote in elections, while his business interests profit from lucrative Government contracts.[141]

Coke's support for the JLP effectively translated into West Kingston's support for the JLP, whose West Kingston constituency has been critical in national elections since the 1950s.[*]

Because of this business-like relationship between the party and the don, when the Golding administration denied Coke's extradition request, accusations that the Prime Minister was simply protecting an ally—that is, engaging in corruption—were inevitable. There were two angles of these accusations, both of which can be found in online comments posted in response to a December 2009 *Gleaner* article about Golding refusing to discuss the extradition request publicly. The first was the idea that the prime minister was indebted to the Don; that because the Coke family had guaranteed for the JLP the political loyalty of West Kingston (and perhaps even more than electoral support, that the Cokes had provided financial support to the party as well), Golding was essentially in the pocket of Coke. The idea is summed up in the online comment, "BRUCE CANT DISCUS DUDUS WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION, DUDUS IS THE ONE THAT HIRED BRUCE "

The second facet of the corruption charge was that by resisting the extradition request, Golding was not only protecting Coke, but he was protecting himself. For if Coke was taken to U.S. federal court, the theory goes, his trial could expose to U.S. prosecutors the depth of the relationship between drug traffickers and the Jamaican political class, and even implicate members of government in Coke's alleged crimes. "Bruce is afraid," stated another online comment. "After all if he dares to send Dudus back for trial who knows what will happen. Bruce has to protect himself and reputation if none if left."[142] This theory is given more weight by the legacy of Coke's father, Lester "Jim Brown" Coke, who preceded Christopher as don of Tivoli Gardens. He was also wanted for extradition to the United States, but while awaiting transfer to U.S. authorities in 1992, he was killed in a suspicious jail cell fire.

The idea of Prime Minister Golding protecting an alleged trafficker sparked a civic debate about the rectitude of elected officials in Jamaica. According to one source, in 2009, "for the first time, corruption ranked first to crime and violence as the area of greatest concern for Jamaicans."[143]

---

[*] See Gray's *Demeaned But Empowered* for a critical history of the dynamic of Jamaican politics and the relationship between the JLP, dons, and West Kingston.

The Protection Racket & Security

The relationship between the JLP and Coke's Shower Posse, however, is more complicated than mutual protection; Golding's motivations for preventing Coke's extradition more nuanced than simply a debt to a drug trafficker. As political scientists have documented, relationships between governments and criminal organizations—what Snyder and Martinez call "state-sponsored protection rackets"—offer stability even in criminal environments.[144] By allowing Coke free reign in West Kingston, the government put the neighborhood under the clear control of one authority. While the Shower Posse engaged in international crime, it also provided benefits to West Kingston residents, enforced safety on the streets, and did not have to fight with other posses for control of the area; its dominion was unquestioned.

It is when such protection rackets are disturbed that violence is inevitable. If there is no clear authority, there is no one to enforce order, and other criminals will fight for the role. Signing the extradition request and arresting Coke would contravene the conditions of power that had been negotiated between Jamaica's political parties and criminal organizations, an implicit contract that had been in place for decades. Local and national officials had good reason to fear that extraditing Coke would lead to violence.

Violence, in fact, was the main reason cited behind closed doors for the government's resistance to Coke's extradition. It merits attention that the Jamaican government never denied the charges against Coke. It never defended him nor pled ignorance of his criminal activities. Its argument against extradition was not the defense of a criminal, but, when speaking privately among each other or with U.S. embassy officials, the avoidance of social upheaval. Cooperating with U.S. counternarcotics policy and authorizing the arrest of Christopher Coke, would, in the judgment of Jamaican officials, risk the security of their people. The pressure the U.S. government impressed upon them to arrest Coke challenged the sovereignty of the Jamaican government to determine what was in the best interest of its own citizens. The conditions of international power, as negotiated in U.S. counternarcotics policy, usurped the conditions of power in Kingston's garrisons as negotiated in Jamaica's political and social order.

It was not only Jamaica's political leaders who feared civil upheaval should Coke be arrested. In fact, in each of the U.S. diplomatic cables describing conversations with concerned Jamaican officials, Embassy staffers acknowledge that such "fears are well founded." In the cable regarding the discussion with Mayor McKenzie, the embassy official writes that the Coke wields "extraordinary power" in parts of West Kingston. "His sudden removal could spark violent incidents and/or unleash rivalries among competing gang factions in Kingston, Spanish Town, and Montego Bay." Despite acknowledging the credible concerns for safety, U.S. officials never changed their approach or insistence on pressing for Coke's extradition.

Jamaican history provides at least one instance in which the implicit rules of the protection racket between the government and the posse were breached. A tacit term of the contract is that the government cedes law enforcement to the posse within their territory. In Tivoli Gardens, Coke's gang enforces internal order, and its

own criminal activity goes unpunished. However, in July 2001, security forces entered Tivoli Gardens on an alleged tip to find a cache of drugs and firearms, in contravention of such an agreement. Not only did they find no such arms stockpile, but their trespassing into the community enraged residents. A 3-day gun battle ensued that left 27 civilians dead.[145] Officials concerned about a violent outcome of Christopher Coke's extradition were not presumptuous in their fears.

CAPITULATION

"I was obliged to take into account security,
international relations, and other matters relating to public interest."
- Attorney General Dorothy Lightbourne,
explaining to the 2011 Commission of Enquiry why,
after nine months of resistance, she decided
to sign the extradition request[146]

On March 1, 2010, the U.S. State Department released its annual drug certification report. In the country assessment of Jamaica, usually very positive, it states that the country's "unusual handling" of Coke's extradition request "raises serious questions about the GOJ's commitment to combating transnational crime." It continues with the assessment that "Jamaica's delay in processing the U.S. extradition request for a major suspected drug and firearms trafficker with reported ties to the ruling party highlights the potential depth of corruption in the government." These two sentences carry great implications for the small country of Jamaica. The doubt raised about Jamaica's "commitment" to combating drug trafficking could be interpreted as a threat by the State Department to decertify the country, a threat that could carry serious economic consequences. Still, Prime Minister Golding continued to resist.

A telling observation in Snyder and Martinez's analysis of state-sponsored protection rackets is that they are more feasible in non-democratic than in democratic regimes. Indeed, it was two pillars of democracy—the free press and an opposition party—that put an end to the stalling tactics of the Golding administration. After revelations surfaced of the involvement of a U.S. lobbying firm, and the prime minister contradicted himself trying to explain it, both the opposition People's National Party (PNP) and the press hounded the matter incessantly, fostering debate within the halls of parliament and civil society about whether the ruling party was protecting a wanted drug lord. Some even called for Golding's resignation. On May 17, he announced to the nation that Lightbourne would allow the extradition to proceed.

Golding and Lightbourne have maintained that their authorization of Coke's extradition was for one reason only: unsustainable political pressure. Lightbourne explained it this way during testimony a year later to the Commission of Enquiry:

> At that time, the public was, everyone was in an uproar, every association in this country was crying out for the matter to be put

> before the Court. Civic organisations, the church, human rights organisations, ordinary citizens, were saying -put the matter before the Court. Bodies and organisations were refusing to co-operate with the Government. It was almost coming to social disorder, that was facing this country, and so I had to review my position.[147]

In his speech to the nation on May 17, 2010, announcing his authorization of the extradition, Golding expressed similar sentiments:

> I wrestled with the potential conflict between the issues of non-compliance with the terms of the treaty and the unavoidable perception that because Coke is associated with my constituency, the government's position was politically contrived. I felt that the concepts of fairness and justice should not be sacrificed in order to avoid that perception. In the final analysis, however, that must be weighed against the public mistrust that this matter has evoked and the destabilizing effect it is having on the nation's business. Accordingly, the Minister of Justice, in consideration of all the factors, will sign the authorization for the extradition process to commence.[148]

Jamaican officials were faced with a conflict that put their legitimacy into question. Continue to challenge the U.S. State Department, and suffer its consequential "decertification," or extradite Coke and unleash a wave of violence, putting the security of its citizens at risk. Golding, in the end, chose the latter. Like the colonial regimes documented in Karras's *Smuggling*, Jamaica's leaders in the end chose to enforce drug laws due to "a great deal of international pressure" rather than a sovereign decision based on their judgment of what would be best for their citizenry.

CHAPTER 4:
THE WEST KINGSTON INCURSION

"A hurricane is coming! A hurricane is coming!"
- man yelling through West Kingston streets,
alerting residents and business owners
that the extradition order has been signed[149]

It was a Monday afternoon when Bruce Golding declared to the nation that he would authorize Coke's extradition. Shopkeepers of Tivoli Gardens' bustling commercial district closed early, creating a traffic jam out of the neighborhood.[150] Newspapers the following day depicted piles of produce carts and old furniture blocking major intersections of West Kingston.[151] Caravans of armored police and military vehicles made their way to the area, and residents, if they didn't leave, stayed indoors.[152]

The capital, having witnessed a pattern of urban conflict throughout the decades when authorities confronted Kingston's garrisons, held its collective breath throughout the week, while both security forces and residents appeared to prepare for battle. Tension turned into violence on Sunday, May 23, when police stations throughout the city were set on fire, tanks carried soldiers into West Kingston, and in a prime time speech, Prime Minister Golding declared a state of emergency—the only way to maintain control, he said, during the hunt for Christopher Coke.[153] The civil unrest that government officials had privately feared was now unfolding before their eyes.

WEST KINGSTON &
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

The extreme reactions of both residents and state authorities are rooted in the history of Tivoli Gardens and its role in Jamaican society. Home to several thousand people near the capital's impoverished old downtown, Tivoli Gardens embodies many of the qualities that the United Nations characterizes as the living conditions of the world's increasing numbers of urban poor,

> trapped in an informal and "illegal" world—in slums that are not reflected on maps, where waste is not collected, where taxes are not paid and where public services are not provided. Officially they do not exist.[154]

In Tivoli Gardens, however, waste *is* collected. Taxes *are* paid. Only, the collector is not the state, but the Shower Posse—Coke's criminal organization funded by international trafficking.

Garrisons are the uniquely Jamaican iteration of a slum—inner-city communities where a don and his posse, rather than the state or a political patron, provide payouts and exact loyalty. While Jamaican sociologist Carl Stone, writing in the 1970s and '80s, described the relationship between the garrisons and political

parties as clientelistic, such a description, Obika Gray argues, has become outdated as criminal dons have replaced politicians as patrons of the garrisons. Now, the community delivers votes for its political party in exchange for autonomy when their party is in power. In fact, apart from election season when politicians may pay a visit to stir fervor among their constituency, garrisons notably lack state institutions. Basic infrastructure such as electricity, recreational facilities, and policing, where present, is provided by the illicit authority. In exchange for votes, politicians turn a blind eye to the criminal activities that support such economic and community development. Most of the time, that is.

The incidents of May 2010 continued a history of violent clashes between the state and community in Tivoli Gardens. Similar raids occurred in 1997, 2001, and 2005. Despite internal stability, the community's autonomy, and the omnipotence of Coke and his "Shower Posse" gang, have contributed to the notoriety of the neighborhood, and over the years Tivoli Gardens became known, in the words of Jamaica's top military admiral, as "the mother of all garrisons," the worst of the worst.[155] While residents describe a sense of internal safety and peace in the neighborhood,[156] its social isolation within Kingston meant that state authorities dared not enter if not by force.

Because of their effective immunity from state authorities when their party is in power, garrisons like Tivoli Gardens have a particularly tense relationship with the police. Some point to the founding of the JCF in 1865—in response to a popular uprising—as the root of today's adversarial relations. Officers were deployed then, as they were during Jamaica's independence, to control and repress the most vulnerable and rebellious sectors of society. Modern crime laws and a justice system that condones and sometimes encourages excessive force have sustained the us-against-them attitude. The United Nations also points to the 1974 Suppression of Crimes Act for aggravating relations between the garrisons and authorities. "The act gave the police extensive search and seizure powers without a warrant. Only repealed in 1993, it is said to have influenced an entire generation of police officers who felt empowered to act without due process constraints."[157]

Whether due to the Suppression of Crime Act, the influx of guns to Jamaican security forces from the U.S. government, the international pressure on the country to arrest suspected narco-criminals, or a combination of the above, the statistics on extrajudicial killings in Jamaica are alarming. Rarely does a day go by without a fatal shooting by a JCF officer. The police force registered 224 police-involved killings in 2008, 263 in 2009, and 320 in 2010, not including the 73 civilians (according to the government's count) killed during the West Kingston incursion. Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), which tracks the data, has tallied more than 2,000 extrajudicial killings between 1998 and 2008, among them boys, girls, and infants. During the same period, only one officer was convicted in the killing of a civilian.[158] For comparison's sake, this is in a country with a population the size of Brooklyn.

Abuses committed by the Jamaican security forces, and the pattern of impunity within the judicial system for such abuse, have drawn attention and condemnation from international bodies. After the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) visited Jamaica in 2008, it reported that "The Commission was informed that a number of [deaths] took place in circumstances consistent with

extrajudicial executions at the hands of police officers."[159] It also concluded that the lower class is disproportionately affected by police abuse. "Victims," states the IACHR's preliminary observations, "are often young men or boys from the inner cities and in some instances they are unarmed and pose no threat to the police." Jamaican Public Defender Earl Witter, whose office receives citizen complaints of police abuse, describes West Kingston as "a place where routinely, persons are killed by illegal gunmen and/or members of the security forces under one pretext or another."[160]

American officials have been cognizant of this history of human rights abuse for years. In 2005, a U.S. Kingston Embassy official wrote a cable to Washington regarding the recent acquittal of six officers in an infamous 2001 JCF operation in which seven young men from the small town of Braeton were killed. "Police impunity for killing civilians will remain a potential problem," the cable stated, "as long as crime scenes are not protected, forensic evidence is poorly collected, if at all, and incompetent investigative practices permit interference by accused officers."[161] The official wrote that the embassy will attempt to assist in judicial reforms so that "all types of criminals" will be properly prosecuted. However, more recent assessments of justice in cases of extrajudicial killings in Jamaica have found those same flaws identified in 2005 to persist in 2010.[162]

Generally speaking, while international observers have condemned such apparent disregard for human rights among Jamaica's security forces, the same cannot be said of the country's political and social elites, for one of two main reasons. First of all, rampant violence—a murder rate, for example, of 52.1 per 100,000, and daily newspaper headlines such as "8-year-old child's throat slashed in Manchester"[163]—have contributed to support among the middle and upper classes for a heavy-handed approach to tackling crime. "Basically," says Carolyn Gomes, Executive Director of JFJ, "they would be quite happy if the security forces went out there and killed all of 'them' who are causing the problem. And they don't see the price we pay… in dead young men killed by mistake." Gomes alludes here to the second reason for mass approval of such an approach: stark social divisions. Kingston's geography alone provides an illustration. There is "uptown," where the middle and upper classes live, and "downtown," encompassing the working class and garrison communities. Half Way Tree Road divides the two, and those from "uptown" rarely cross to the other side if they can help it. When the country's political elites have little contact with "downtown" residents who are most impacted by police abuse, it is easier for them to accept the story invariably given by authorities—that those shot by police are gunmen, and deserved what they got. In the words of Gomes, "those communities become 'them' for 'us' who live outside of them, and we don't care what the police do."[164] It came as no surprise, then, that when the 2001 police raid in Tivoli Gardens resulted in 27 civilian deaths, no official was held accountable nor was there any mass and sustained movement among civil society demanding justice.

The corollary to unchecked police abuse is the adversarial attitude among garrison communities towards security forces. The IACHR summed it up this way: "The high number of police shootings of civilians and the lack of clarification and accountability in many cases have contributed to a situation of impunity that

undermines the credibility of the police and the confidence of the public."[165] Residents who have witnessed police shoot innocent people, or know victims of police shootings, are unlikely to assist police in investigations or call upon them for help. "People afraid fi' give information to them, 'cause they can't be trusted," said one West Kingston resident, whose son was killed while in the custody of security forces. [*166] "Me, as a mother, if I had to make a call to them, me nuh gonna do it cause me 'fraid me life, them gonna come kill me too… Me 'fraid of the police and the security force."

This attitude is typical in the garrisons, meaning that if and when security forces conduct an operation there, their only recourse is to enter by force and search the community indiscriminately. This is one reason law enforcement in Jamaica is routinely characterized by the use of extra-constitutional powers, whether through curfews and states of emergency, or forceful and illegal invasions of private properties and violations of civil and human rights. For a half-century, this vicious cycle of mutual mistrust and excess force has repeated to no foreseeable end in the garrison communities of Jamaica.

ENTERING TIVOLI

"The state of emergency will enable the security forces to exercise extraordinary powers necessary to deal with this extraordinary situation. These include the power to restrict the freedom of movement, search premises, and detain persons suspected of involvement in unlawful activities without warrant. These are necessary measures to restore order to a community that is now threatened."
- Prime Minister Bruce Golding addressing the nation, May 23, 2010[167]

By the Sunday following the government's authorization of Coke's arrest, it was clear that, once again, authorities would require extraordinary powers to enter Tivoli Gardens, where Coke was assumed to be hiding. The one-month state of emergency for the corporate area (comprised of Kingston and St. Andrew Parish) commenced at 6 that night. According to news reports from the scene, street battles began the following day, when soldiers attempting to enter on tanks were fired upon and responded in kind.[168] By now, the only question in the minds of Jamaicans who had witnessed this scene countless times before was how great the bloodshed would be.

Public Defender Earl Witter opened an office in Tivoli Gardens that week to record citizens' complaints. He received more than 1,000,[169] including testimonies

> of atrocities, and of unlawful homicides, committed by members of the security forces, from common assault to unlawful homicide, malicious and unwarranted destruction of property and so on. And injuries

[*] The identities of West Kingston residents interviewed by the author have been removed as a precautionary measure to protect their safety.

> sustained by citizens because of illegal activities on the part of the security forces are alleged.[170]

Among those who filed a complaint with Witter's office was a 35-year-old resident of Denham Town, which borders Tivoli Gardens. She recounted soldiers killing her brother when they took control of her apartment building:

> I was home, there was a lot of gunshots, so we couldn't hear him scream, but others heard him. I was underneath the bed from Sunday. I didn't come up until Tuesday evening 5pm when they give us a chance to use the bathroom, catch water.[171]

It was there that she saw a body wrapped in a bloody sheet in the latrine. Only later, talking with others in the building, did she realize it was that of her brother.

> He was taken from his house, and taken to his brother's house in the same building and he was murdered. After they murder him, they put him down the stairs, wrapped him in a lot of sheets and carpets, and stuff him in the bathroom.

The pubic defender's office directed her to bodies dumped in a nearby cemetery, which is where she found her brother's corpse with a gunshot wound in the knee.

Another Denham Town resident spoke of the fear she experienced during the incursion. "That week, nobody went out," said the 46-year-old. She remained in her high-rise apartment with her young daughter and 29-year-old son while soldiers scoured the area. The third time they came to her home, in the late morning a week after the state of emergency was declared, they crowded into her living room and told her that her son, who limped because of an injured foot, looked like "a shotta." They said they'd have to take him in for questioning.

> Afterward them take him and them take him downstairs. Me look from the house and me see 30 soldiers round him. When me run downstairs, me see him tremble, so I say, "Why you go interrogate me son for? Him no used to them thing." A jeep come and them say they gonna take him and go search, see if him wanted or something. Me say, "alright, no problem." Me take him phone from him. And him go away.[172]

That evening, she began to walk through downtown and West Kingston, asking for her son at police stations and hospitals. By then, soldiers had gained control of the area and gunfire had subsided, making it safe for her to go out. Finally, on Thursday, four days after her son was taken, she found his body on a stretcher at the Denham Town Police Station, killed with a bullet to the pelvis.

These stories were typical of those who experienced the West Kingston incursion that first week of the state of emergency. Extensive interviews by the author with nine residents of Denham Town and Tivoli Gardens, and with the Public

Defender who also collected residents' testimony, paint a picture of indiscriminate violence and abuse by soldiers roaming the streets. Together, they demonstrate that residents of West Kingston experienced just the sort of upheaval and abuse that the Jamaican and American governments had feared, or at least had all the reason to expect—that the operation would result in violence, that the poorest sectors of the population would be the most adversely affected, and that security forces would commit widespread abuse. Let us dissect these ramifications one at a time,

First of all, because of the history of animosity between the West Kingston garrisons and the Jamaican security forces, the soldiers and police officers that entered Tivoli Gardens in search of Coke had little intelligence to guide their search, and thus, as they had in past operations in the community, they relied on pure force. "Them just shooting like crazy," described a 29-year-old resident of Denham Town who hid under her bed for several days until the shots subsided.

Secondly, despite Coke's wealth and his connections with business and government elites, it was by and large the poor and working class garrison residents who were raided by security forces and consequently incurred the most violence and abuse. Most of the residents interviewed by the author were single mothers. They lived in public housing or self-built homes of plywood slabs that bullets easily penetrated. "Me no have no money," said the woman whose son was taken from her home. "They kill me [son] and me no have no money. Me no know how me a manage." For her and many others, the weeklong incursion impacted not only their lives but their precarious livelihoods, as Coronation Market, the commercial heartbeat of the neighborhood and the workplace of hundreds of female heads of households in West Kingston, partially burned down. During this time, with a few isolated exceptions, middle- and upper-class Kingstonians, while frightened by news reports, the sound of gunfire, and the sight of smoke, enjoyed the relative safety and calm of their exclusive uptown neighborhoods.

Thirdly, first-hand testimony illustrates the massive abuse by security forces involved in the West Kingston operation. A 37-year-old resident who ran through an alley during the gunfire to find her younger sister said, "Me no see no gunmen. It's pure soldier shots me a see," contradicting official reports that soldiers fired on civilians because they were under attack from gunmen.

By Tuesday following the prime minister's Sunday evening declaration of the state of emergency, 26 civilians were declared dead. By the end of the week, the official count had risen to 73.[*] The pursuit of Coke expanded beyond West Kingston, too. In the pre-dawn hours of Thursday morning, soldiers arrived by helicopter at the hilly Kingston suburb of Kirkland Heights. They sprayed gunfire through the roof and exterior walls of the home of Keith Clarke, a businessman, before entering and killing Clarke while his wife and teenage daughter were present.[173] Clarke suffered 20 entry wounds to his body. No explanation has been given for the raid.

---

[*] Authorities stopped counting after May 29, the Saturday following the start of the state of emergency, by which time gunfire had subsided and West Kingston was for the most part under the control of a heavy military presence. This means that those killed after Saturday, such as the 29-year-old taken from his mother's Denham Town apartment on Sunday and found dead the following week, are not included in the official count.

It is unclear if any of these operations led authorities to Christopher Coke, who was found a month after the search for him began, at a vehicle checkpoint just outside Kingston, leading to an arrest free of incident.

****

Coke's capture and swift extradition to the United States did not, however, bring an end to the unrestrained actions of Jamaica's security forces. In fact, the night of Coke's arrest, with the state of emergency about to expire, parliament voted to extend it for another month. While violent confrontation between security forces and the West Kingston community had subsided by June, it was only because soldiers maintained a heavy presence in the area, while continuing to exploit powers granted by the state of emergency throughout the summer. For instance, massive sweeps of young men resulted in improvised and overcrowded detention centers. According to data collected by JFJ,

> young men were corralled into custody and 'processed' before being released without charge. 'Processing' includes the fingerprinting and photographing of individuals who have been detained without being afforded an opportunity to secure legal representation. The detentions lasted in some instances for days, in others cases for weeks.[174]

The state of emergency granted security forces the authority to detain civilians without warrant, and the rhetoric of the Golding administration encouraged them to use it. "We must confront this criminal element with determination and unqualified resolve," Golding told the nation when he declared the state of emergency.[175] As a result, detainees were held and processed in a haphazard manner. Several of them ended up unaccounted for. Aside from the young man taken by soldiers and found dead in a police station, "there are at least three persons who were last seen in the custody of the Security Forces," reported JFJ, who "have not been seen since."[176]

The wave of crime-fighting measures continued in July, when parliament passed legislation granting law enforcement greater powers of detention and curtailing the rights of detainees. Opposition MPs and human rights advocates said the reforms potentially violated citizens' rights.[*] But not until late July did the fervor for combating crime by any means necessary begin to cool, and the opposition party blocked Golding's request to extend the state of emergency for a second time. "That is the behavior of a police or fascist state,"[177] said Peter Bunting, the PNP spokesman on national security, in explaining his party's objection. "We cannot agree for persons to be held month after month... Just because the security forces ask for it doesn't mean it should be rubber-stamped." By then, within the two-month state of emergency that had commenced with the hunt for Christopher Coke, more than

[*] See JFJ's *The State of Human Rights in Jamaica Since the State of Emergency 2010* for an explanation of the crime bills. They include the extension of a detention period from 24 to 72 hours and higher barriers for a defendant to be granted bail.

4,000 Jamaicans had been detained and processed without charge,[178] at least one soldier and 74 residents had died, and the hostility between garrison communities and the authorities had only escalated.

CHAPTER 5:
EPILOGUE

*"We will continue our efforts to defeat organized crime
and to restore law and order in this country while, at the same time,
turning around the crime and security situation."*
- Jamaican Commissioner of Police Owen Ellington, upon Coke's arrest[179]

*"This arrest and extradition to face charges are the next steps
in ensuring Coke and his 'Shower Posse' drug organization are brought to justice.
I'd also like to commend the United States Attorney's Office, …the Jamaican authorities
and DEA Caribbean Division's Kingston, Jamaica Country Office."*
- John P. Gilbride, DEA New York Special Agent-in-Charge[180]

More than two years after the request for his extradition, and a year and a half following his arrest, Christopher Coke is in a Manhattan jail cell, awaiting sentencing after he pled guilty in August 2011 to the trafficking charges against him. In that time, the scandals surrounding his extradition have produced ripple effects through Jamaican politics and society. These include Bruce Golding's political fallout within Jamaica, and the risk of Jamaica's reputation internationally, particularly in the eyes of the United States. Only by considering the long-term ramifications of Coke's extradition can we fully appreciate the impact of the War on Drugs on Jamaica, and the real concerns and priorities of the United States in carrying out this war.

HUMAN RIGHTS

When reports of large numbers of civilian deaths emerged during the first week of the state of emergency, international and domestic human rights organizations called on the Jamaican government to investigate the West Kingston incursion. "Amnesty International has called for a thorough investigation into the deaths of dozens of people in the Jamaican capital Kingston during a security operation to arrest an alleged drug dealer,"[181] states a press release from the London-based organization issued May 27, 2010. Amnesty International was not alone. "The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expresses its deep concern about the wave of violence that Jamaica has been experiencing since May 23, 2010," stated an IACHR press release the following day. "The Commission deeply regrets the deaths that have occurred in this context, and urgently calls on the State of Jamaica to conduct a diligent, effective, and impartial investigation of these events."[182]

Within Jamaica, Public Defender Earl Witter not only called for an investigation; he furnished the Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI), the police unit responsible for investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings, with evidence.

> We gave them a list. We gave them basic details, a synopsis of allegations of how these people claim to have been killed [that] we ferreted from reports made to us by citizens. We provided them with

> the names of witnesses, with addresses and telephone numbers and so on. And we let them know that in our opinion these allegations should be investigated because they appear, on the face of them, to be instances of extrajudicial killings.[183]

But the BSI failed to respond, and it was not until Witter took his complaints to the press that the government sent forensic investigators to West Kingston. By then, practically the entire neighborhood was a crime scene, and the BSI's capacity to investigate was overwhelmed. When the street violence came to an end in early June, Witter called for a comprehensive investigation of the operation. "If the truth or reality of what happened is ever to be known, it won't come unless there is a judicial inquiry."

But such demands were ignored, even after the state of emergency had come to a close and the chaos of the incursion itself had subsided. Witter continued to press for a judicial inquiry, but the only investigations that the government has engaged in are the BSI's individual case files of alleged extrajudicial killings. Even those, JFJ's Carolyn Gomes observed, are questionable. "What kind of investigation can be proper when bodies have been removed without the scene being preserved? Where shells have been removed, where rifles that had allegedly been used have not been collected weeks after for ballistic testing, where people's hands have not been swabbed, where you will never be able to assign responsibility for individual deaths?" More than 18 months after those deaths occurred, the BSI has issued no word on the progress of its investigations.

Prime Minister Golding's apparent indifference to human rights concerns was exemplified in his prime time speech to the nation on July 21, 2010, the eve of the state of emergency's expiration. His neglect to even mention the dozens of West Kingston deaths conveys his administration's consistent attitude that human rights distract from the more important fight against crime. "Residents in some communities have been inconvenienced," he said, as his only reference to the violent incursion, "but it is the price we must ask them to pay to enable us to deal with the extraordinary phenomenon that crime has proven to be."[184] Golding stepped down in October 2011 without ever opening the sort of comprehensive inquiry into the West Kingston operation urged by Amnesty International, the IACHR, and the Public Defender. A May 2011 editorial in the *Jamaica Gleaner* noted that "it has been almost a year since the tragic events of last May." It is worth quoting at length:

> There have been many questions about some of the Tivoli Gardens deaths, and claims that a number of young men who were taken away by either police or soldiers, or both, remain unaccounted for.
>
> There have been calls for a commission of enquiry into the Tivoli Gardens incident and coroner's inquests into all the deaths. The latter seems impractical, given that ballistic tests on all the weapons used by the police and soldiers in the operation are ongoing.
>
> In the meantime, however, it would help the public's understanding and appreciation of the events of the Tivoli

> engagement if the heads of the security forces were to share the initial findings of their reviews of the conduct of the police and soldiers during that operation. They should, for instance, say whether these showed full adherence to, or breaches of, the rules of engagement and/or any breakdown of discipline.
>
> Statements of these kinds go to the accountability of the security forces and would help, either way, in the building of public trust.[185]

The editorial concludes with the observation that if the Tivoli Gardens operation was too large and complex to thoroughly investigate, the same challenge does not exist in the case of the businessman, Keith Clarke, who was killed in his suburban home the same week of the West Kingston incursion. “Up to now, there has been no explanation from the army of the circumstances in which Mr. Clarke was killed… The silence deserves to be broken.”

Carolyn Gomes, a veteran observer of the JCF, predicts that the West Kingston incursion will end up like so many other chapters in the bloody history of Jamaica’s security forces.

> There was a Tivoli incursion in 2001, where 20-something people died. People just walking to market, people just on the side of the road, cart men just pushing carts, pregnant women going to market There’s not been an explanation, there’s not been one person held accountable for that Tivoli incursion in 2001. But, nobody’s been held accountable for the 7 dead at Braeton either, and nobody’s been held accountable for the deaths of 2 women and 2 men in an absolutely dead-end district of Crawle.*[186]

Gomes said that this lack of serious investigations into allegations of extrajudicial killings only encourages more of the same. “If nobody’s ever held accountable for anything, then nothing changes, and yes, it could happen again tomorrow.” Witter concurs, stating that if security forces were held accountable for their actions,

> it may be that if instead of killing, police officers sought to disarm, arrest, and charge, and gather up the evidence, and take persons before an impartial court to be charged by law, in which forum they are guaranteed and ensured that they have a fair trial—which is a promise of the constitution, fundamental rights of the freedoms provision—it may be that there would be fewer killings. And heaven knows that we need to reduce the number we have.

The Jamaican government, for its part, has maintained that its tough-on-crime strategy has indeed made Jamaica safer. “The country reaped significant success in

---

* In May of 2003, four people were gunned down in the small town of Crawle by a special police unit, which was disbanded after the killings.

crime fighting in 2010," began the government's official release of 2010 crime data.[187] It cited a 15 percent drop in murders from the previous year and single-digit percentage drops in rape, robbery, and carnal abuse.*

Yet one must ask if crime data from 2010 can be compared to previous years, when for two months, the Kingston Metropolitan Area, home to a third of the country's population[188] and three out of every four homicides[189] lived under a state of emergency, with curfews, mass detentions, and a heavy soldier presence in many neighborhoods. An alternative interpretation of the 2010 statistics is offered by JFJ, which pointed out that extrajudicial killings jumped 20 percent from the previous year to 309. The organization also observed that the government did not include in its tally of homicides or police killings those who were killed in the West Kingston incursion. Adding the official number of 73 civilian casualties during the West Kingston incursion to the government's tally of police-involved killings, nearly 400 Jamaicans were killed by the security forces in 2010. Or, in JFJ's interpretation, "more than one in five Jamaicans who died violently last year died at the hands of the State."[190]

POLITICAL FALLOUT

While calls for an inquiry into allegations of human rights violations were brushed aside, members of the opposition People's National Party saw to it that allegations of corruption would not be ignored. Months after Coke was extradited to the United States, PNP leaders continued to question Golding's handling of the extradition request. Their criticism focused specifically on the hiring of the Manatt, Phelps & Phillips firm and Golding's fumbling explanations for it.[191] Jamaican media followed the story as well, publishing in late August emails between the firm and Golding administration officials.[192] The scandal developed throughout the fall, with opposition MPs calling, again, for Golding's resignation.

In response, Golding established a commission of inquiry to complete a full review of "the request by the US Government for the extradition of Christopher Coke, the manner in which the request was dealt with and the engagement by Harold Brady and Company of US law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips."[193] However, beginning with Golding's own appointment of the three commissioners,[194] and ending with a report in which they concluded that neither he nor anyone else in his administration acted improperly, the inquiry proved to be little more than a political circus—a chance for both parties, through three and a half months of public testimony and accusatory questioning, to score political points. The final report offered no recommendations and amounted to not one disciplinary action, reform, or harsh word for the Golding administration. "Mistakes and errors of judgment were made," the commission concluded, "but no one in our view was guilty of misconduct in the part he or she played in the matter of the extradition of Mr. Coke." This was despite the many contradictions and cover-ups within the Golding

* Even with those drops, Jamaica's homicide rate in 2010 ranked fourth highest in the world, at 52.1 per 100,000, according to the "UN Global Study on Homicide," 2011.

administration that the hearings revealed. "It is regrettable," the commissioners wrote, "that the memories of some of these witnesses failed them."[195]

Despite the commission's tepid conclusion, the inquiry, covered tenaciously by the local press corps, prevented Golding from moving on from the affair, and from shaking off accusations that he had tried to protect a wanted drug trafficker. In early October 2011, the man who was thought to be the rising star of the JLP announced his resignation as prime minister a year before his five-year term was up. In a national address, he explained that the Coke affair had played a significant role in his decision to step down. He felt again, for perhaps the last time, a need to defend himself:

> Questions about the role I played in the Coke/Manatt matter have remained a source of concern in the minds of many people. It was never about Coke's guilt or innocence. It was about a breach of our Constitution and had it been a person other than Coke it perhaps would never have become the cause célèbre that it turned out to be. We have since amended the Interception of Communications Act to permit in the future, the action that was taken in Coke's case but which, at that time, was in violation of our Constitution.
>
> However, the entire episode has affected me deeply and the perceptions that are held by some people have not been dispelled, notwithstanding the exhaustive deliberations of a Commission of Enquiry.
>
> I cannot allow the challenges we face and the issues that we as a people must confront to be smothered or overpowered by this saga and the emotions that they ignite. It would not be fair to my country; it would not be fair to my party.[196]

Whether Golding will ever be able to leave such perceptions behind and once again take a leadership role in Jamaican politics is yet to be known, as is the extent of damage the Coke affair inflicted on the Jamaica Labour Party. The next general elections are scheduled for the end of 2011.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

The allegations of corruption and human rights violations that dogged Coke's extradition process had the potential to seriously damage Jamaica's relationship with the United States. The Golding administration's nine-month rebuff of the extradition exhibited an affront to U.S. foreign policy. The involvement of a U.S. firm to lobby on behalf of that position may have sent a strong signal to the State Department of the collusion between politicians and drug dons in Jamaica. Finally, the deaths of so many civilians during the hunt for Coke, in addition to allegations of other abuses by security forces carrying out the extradition warrant could have raised concern among U.S. politicians and State Department officials.

If any step of this process concerned U.S. officials, as the world's economic leader, a major donor to Jamaica, and an influential voice in the international arena, the United States had many tools at its disposal with which to reprimand Jamaica for its handling of the extradition. For one, the annual drug certification process, or the INCSR, was created for just such a purpose. If the State Department does not approve of a foreign government's actions or inactions regarding counternarcotics policy and enforcement, this is where it will take note.

American officials could have used diplomatic influence as well, if they felt the need to condemn Jamaica's handling of the extradition. For example, expressions of concern for alleged human rights violations during the state of emergency came from all over the world, and the United States could have added its voice to give more weight to those concerns.

It could have resorted to stronger measures as well. The Leahy Amendment to the 1997 foreign aid appropriations bill was written with the motivation of preventing the United States from supporting human rights abuses abroad. It prohibits counternarcotics funding of foreign security forces whose members are "credibly alleged to have committed gross human rights violations with impunity."[197] If U.S. officials were to have been moved by the arguments made by Jamaicans for Justice and Public Defender Witter that the West Kingston incursion did indeed result in such allegations, and that no one has been held responsible, legislators could have chosen to enforce the Leahy Amendment and pull American assistance from Jamaica's military and police forces.

With all these strategic tactics at its disposal, how did the United States respond to the Jamaican government's handling of Coke's extradition? First, the State Department used the drug certification process to condemn the Jamaican government's resistance to implementing its counternarcotics policies, in this case, Coke's extradition. As documented in chapter three, the U.S. rendered what could be interpreted as a warning to the Golding administration in its 2010 INCSR country report on Jamaica. Published in March 2010, the State Department's recognition of "the potential depth of corruption in the government,"[198] was poured over by the Jamaican media, and contributed to the debate surrounding Golding's resistance.

Two months later, Golding yielded to American and domestic pressure and authorized the extradition. From that point forward, the reaction of U.S. officials to the extradition process conveyed nothing but approval. Publicly, at least, they have signaled a willingness to maintain a close relationship with the Jamaican government, and have remained mum on the violence and allegations of human rights abuse that resulted in the course of Coke's apprehension. For example, a U.S. Justice Department press release regarding Coke's arrest applauds Jamaican law enforcement authorities for their work and their cooperation with the DEA.[199] It only briefly mentions the violence that marred the extradition process: "We are relieved that Coke's arrest and transfer to New York," the press release quotes a U.S. attorney as stating, "was not marked by the violence that had gripped the streets of Jamaica for so many days." What it neglects to mention is what this violence consisted of; that it constituted the largest massacre in Jamaica's recent history; that the security forces involved faced accusations of killing innocent civilians; or that

the Jamaican government had instituted a period of curtailed constitutional rights in order to carry out the operation.

The INCSR of 2011, the first to be published since Coke was extradited, recounts the process matter-of-factly:

> Coke was wanted in the United States on drug and firearms trafficking charges. In May 2010, the GOJ acted to arrest and extradite Coke in a large-scale JCF and JDF operation that resulted in 73 deaths and, ultimately, the arrest and extradition of Coke to the United States where he awaits trial.[200]

By omission of any reproach of the operation, the INCSR indicates approval of the way Coke was extradited, the associated state of emergency, and the West Kingston incursion by security forces that resulted in more than 73 deaths. Like the 2010 INCSR, it mentions pervasive corruption within the Jamaican government and law enforcement. But it also describes approvingly several ways that the authorities are working to address the problem. In sum, it states, "Cooperation between the GOJ and the USG in efforts to curb narcotics and related transnational crime remains strong overall."[201]

Given the favorable review of the extradition by the U.S. Justice and State Departments, it is unlikely that the Leahy Amendment would be considered as a response to the West Kingston incursion. By all appearances, U.S. officials have chosen to turn a blind eye to the credible allegations of human rights violations committed in the process of Coke's extradition. This comes as no surprise, as Isacson[202] and others have pointed out that despite conditionalities attached to U.S. counter-drug assistance that would suggest a concern for human rights, rarely are those conditions seriously reviewed and enforced.[*]

To be clear, U.S. officials were well aware of the violent nature of Coke's extradition and the allegations of human rights abuses that resulted. A background report on Jamaica prepared for Congress in July 2010 describes the 2010 state of emergency and states that "human rights organizations have called on the government to conduct a thorough investigation into the killings, especially since Jamaica's police forces have been criticized for many years for extrajudicial killings and the indiscriminate use of force."[203] Regardless of this information, the U.S. government has neglected to make any calls for an improvement in the human rights situation in Jamaica, to rescind its aid to Jamaica's security forces, or to modify its counternarcotics policy so that it does not result in the violent civil upheaval and human rights abuses that unfolded in Kingston.

****

[*] As another example of unenforced human rights conditionalities, 15 percent of select U.S. counternarcotics funds for Mexico are to be tied to certain human rights criteria, but Human Rights Watch has documented that despite overwhelming evidence that Mexico has not met those conditions, the U.S. has released the funds anyways. See the 2011 Human Rights Watch report, "Neither Rights Nor Security," p. 23.

The response of the U.S. government to Christopher Coke's extradition illustrates that the U.S. failed to accept responsibility as an agent in the violence, state brutality, and human rights abuses that were alleged in the implementation of its extradition request for Christopher Coke. As the Cold War and the War on Terror have also proven, where U.S. policy concerns "national security," notions of justice and individual rights lose out when they are seen to be in conflict with that greater goal.

Chapters three and four documented that U.S. State Department officials were well aware that Coke's extradition would likely result in violence, that the violence would likely include human rights abuses, and that human rights abuses would likely go unpunished. At no point in the process of Coke's extradition did justified concern for the safety of Jamaican citizens result in a reconsideration of U.S. policy or a strategy to mitigate the foreseen harm to an impoverished Jamaican community. The aftermath of the extradition process that we have reviewed here demonstrates that the brutality involved in the operation did not cause U.S. officials to reform counternarcotics operations in Jamaica. This indicates an acknowledgment that such fatal consequences of the War on Drugs may occur again. In contrast to the axiom that fighting drug trafficking is necessary for security, Coke's extradition proved that citizen security, human rights, and justice are accepted casualties in the War on Drugs.

CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION

In early 2012, a Southern District Court judge will determine the prison sentence for Coke. Federal prosecutors and the DEA will consider the long chapter of his extradition resolved, and pat themselves on the back for one more victory in the War on Drugs: a major don of the illicit underworld locked up. But before they move on to the next *traficante*, capo, or don, they should ask themselves what Jamaicans, Mexicans, and others who inhabit the battlefields of this war are forced to ask: At what cost do we lock up the traffickers? And is it a price worth paying?

The extradition of Christopher Coke exemplified the discrepancies between the purported goals of the War on Drugs and the consequences on its battlegrounds. The insistence by U.S. officials of an operation that a foreign government vehemently opposed undermined Jamaica's sovereignty. Their disregard for the legitimate concerns of violence that the extradition would entail demonstrated a lack of concern for civilians' safety. And their silence on credible allegations of human rights violations proved that, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary and legislation intended to prioritize the rights and security of citizens, human rights are subordinate to counternarcotics policy. Despite the pretext of America's War on Drugs—that drug control is necessary for maintaining security throughout the hemisphere—its implementation in this case generated the opposite effect by fomenting an environment of insecurity for the most vulnerable population of Jamaicans.

What *Did* Coke's Extradition Accomplish?

Proponents of the War on Drugs might argue that civil unrest, political instability, and the use of excess force by law enforcement were necessary repercussions in a greater effort to bring about a lasting reduction in drug trafficking and an improvement in regional security. So aside from the unintended consequences of Coke's extradition described thus far, what did it achieve in terms of the broader mission of the War on Drugs?

Of course, any answer would be speculative, as success in the fight against drug trafficking could take years to materialize. But data collected from the same strategy implemented throughout the history of the War on Drugs offer some guidance. From the extradition of hundreds of Colombian traffickers since the 1980s, to that of Caribbean traffickers in the past decade, and the current crackdown on cartel leaders in Mexico, the U.S.-led counternarcotics strategy has emphasized the apprehension of traffickers. During the same time, cocaine production and supply, while fluctuating throughout the years and across the countries of production, has not drastically changed.[204]

In fact, many analysts have concluded that targeting major traffickers may do more harm than good to the goal of supply reduction. States the 2010 UN World Drug Report,

> The fight against the drug cartels is a legitimate and necessary undertaking, but this may not automatically reduce the cocaine market. History has shown that break-ups of big cocaine cartels may lead to the emergence of a larger number of smaller groups. Increased competition can produce lower prices, which could even encourage higher use levels.[205]

As stated in chapter two, this is, in fact, a common explanation for the rise of Mexican drug cartels, which, the theory goes, took advantage of the dissolution of large Colombian cartels in the eighties and nineties. Given this well-documented pattern, it would be unrealistic to assume that the imprisonment of a major Jamaican drug don would curtail the transit of cocaine through Jamaica. A more likely scenario would be that smaller posses from Jamaica or other nearby countries would fight for the illicit business that is, presumably, now up for grabs, resulting in not only a persistent flow of drugs through the region, but an increase in violence.

****

To be clear, the problem with the American imposition of its counternarcotics strategy in foreign countries is not only its failure to actually curtail drugs, nor the social and political crises that ensue. It is that the hegemony of U.S. policy precludes alternative strategies, ones devised and supported by the countries impacted by drug trafficking. The U.S. is not to blame for the Jamaican security forces' pattern of human rights violations, or for the reputed collusion between Jamaican narco-traffickers and politicians. Both have complex roots in Jamaican history. However, if Jamaican political leaders wanted to address drug control differently—in a way that takes into account the specific cultural, social, and economic dynamics of the country and would pose less of a threat to national security and political stability, as they intended to do with the Ganja Commission—their hands are tied.

America's insistence on imposing its own drug control policy worldwide prevents other nations from exercising their sovereign powers to write and enforce domestic drug policy. In Jamaica, this means that drug control, under American direction and with significant American funding, is carried out by a security force with a known history of human rights abuse; without the infrastructure needed for criminal investigations or police accountability; and without the economic development that would provide the urban poor with viable alternatives to joining the lucrative trade. American counternarcotics policy allows Jamaica only one way to fight drugs. And that way has not worked.

THE FUTURE OF DRUG CONTROL

When newly elected President Barack Obama addressed his counterparts at the Summit of the Americas in April 2009, he suggested a change in direction from the hegemony of U.S. counternarcotics policy. "We seek an equal partnership," he said in his opening remarks.[206] "There is no senior partner and junior partner in our

relations." To prove his commitment, President Obama addressed an aspect of drug-related violence that has long frustrated Latin American leaders: the responsibility of the United States for the flow of guns across the region.[207] "We will take aggressive action," Obama said, "to stop the flow of guns and bulk cash south across our borders." The State Department has recognized what America's neighbors have long complained of—that while the supply of cocaine originates in Latin America, the supply of guns behind drug-related violence in the region originates in the United States, which has relatively lax regulations. A 2010 State Department report found that "approximately 70 percent of the illegal firearms entering Jamaica originated from the U.S."[208]

The 1997 regional Illicit Trafficking in Firearms Convention (CIFTA) would regulate the trafficking of arms across borders, and has been ratified by nearly every country in the Western Hemisphere except the United States. During President Obama's 2009 state visit to Mexico, which was then, as now, suffering astronomical rates of drug-related gun violence, the treaty dominated talks between the two presidents. [209] That's why Obama received a large applause at the Summit of the Americas for the statement, "I'm making it a priority to ratify the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms Convention."

Two years later, however, political challenges have prevented the fulfillment of that promise. Opposition among legislators and lobbying by the gun industry has precluded its required two-thirds Senate vote.[210] As the primary step of U.S. counternarcotics reform that Caribbean and Latin American leaders have called for, the failure to ratify CIFTA could be a telling signal of the barriers to changing a 30-year paradigm. While dictating to the rest of the region a specific drug control strategy, the United States continues to neglect the concerns of other nations regarding trafficking-related violence.

On the other hand, never in the history of the War on Drugs has there been such vociferous questioning of its tactics from the highest echelons of power. Aside from the UNODC's conclusion that apprehending major traffickers may result in more violence, U.S. Congressional researchers have also highlighted the policy's flaws. The 2011 Congressional background report, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs" states that

> Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. government has invested billions of dollars in anti-drug assistance programs aimed at reducing the flow of Latin American-sourced illicit drugs to the United States. As a result of this so-called "balloon effect," efforts have done little to reduce the overall availability of illicit drugs in the United States. In addition, some observers assert that certain mainstays of U.S.-funded counterdrug programs… have had unintended social and economic consequences.[211]

Another recent Congressional study into counternarcotics contracts in Latin America, which currently top half a billion dollars annually, found that there is little coordination, accountability, or benchmarks of success for their work.[212] Legislators have taken note. "Clearly," U.S. Congressman Eliot Engel told his colleagues in 2009,

"the time has come to reexamine our counternarcotics efforts here at home and throughout the Americas."[213] The House of Representatives unanimously voted to create an independent commission to do just that.

Despite growing recognition of the failure of a 30-year strategy, President Obama's regional counternarcotics initiatives appear thus far to perpetuate the strategy of the War on Drugs that dates back to Reagan's presidency. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative that launched in 2010 amounted to $37 million in U.S. aid to the region its first year, and nearly double that in 2011, the bulk of which will be used for military and law enforcement assistance and training. [214]

One distinguishing aspect of the initiative is that it coordinates strategy regionally rather than working with countries individually, in an attempt to preempt the balloon effect.[215] But aside from relying on the cooperation of every country in the region, the success of such a goal would depend on each nation taking the same steps to combat trafficking, an impractical idea given their unique resources, challenges, and political persuasions. Besides, the metaphorical balloon has already stretched beyond the Western Hemisphere, as indicated by the recent development of West Africa as an international cocaine transit point.[216]

The Obama administration has taken pains to stress the inclusion in these new initiatives of simultaneous support for economic development, institution-building, and justice sector reforms—what it calls a comprehensive approach to "citizen safety."[217] Critical analyses of the War on Drugs support the need for such a development-oriented approach,[218] but it is too soon to tell how committed the administration is to this aspect of combating drug trafficking. Past administrations have similarly promised economic, development, and institutional assistance in tandem with a military-oriented counternarcotics approach, with disappointing results.* The Obama administration's apparent lack of concern for "citizen safety" during Coke's extradition is not an encouraging sign of its commitment to overall citizen welfare in Latin America and the Caribbean within the framework of counternarcotics policy.

Besides, it would be naïve to think a policy's proven failure alone is enough to motivate political change. In fact, on May 27, 2010, the same day Caribbean leaders gathered in Washington for the launch of the CBSI, Florida Congressman Connie Mack spoke about what he saw as the need to continue and strengthen U.S. foreign counternarcotics policy. Addressing a Congressional hearing on counterterrorism in the Western Hemisphere, Rep. Mack called for more U.S. assistance to Mexico in its fight against drug cartels. In response to President Calderón's pleas for the ratification of CIFTA, Mack called for the protection of Second Amendment rights. "We cannot allow others to use this situation in order to advance their gun ban agenda here in the United States,"[219] Mack said, ironically framing the interests of foreign countries in the War on Drugs as a threat to U.S. sovereignty.

Despite the lack of any clear indication that the supply-side strategy of the War on Drugs is working, funding for it continues to increase. American funding for

---

* As Beruff and Cordero observe, Jamaica reluctantly signed the Shiprider Agreement only after the United States promised economic assistance. "However, the Clinton administration failed to deliver on these promises," p. 323.

counternarcotics contracts in Latin America rose by 32% between 2005 and 2009,[220] and in Jamaica alone, U.S. counternarcotics funds increased 62% between 2008 and 2010.[221] Altogether, drug enforcement assistance to Latin American and the Caribbean exceeded $1.2 billion in 2009.[222] To cut or redistribute such amounts would challenge powerful and long-invested interests, including the U.S. and foreign militaries, defense contractors, arms manufacturers, and boosters of a philosophy of unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America, a tenet with antecedents dating back at least two centuries. Of all the commitments President Obama made during his 2009 Summit of the Americas opening address, perhaps the most important one to evaluate is this: "The United States will be willing to acknowledge past errors where those errors have been made." The lesson the Coke extradition saga teaches us is that the United States is unwilling to acknowledge the errors of its War on Drugs, and can therefore be expected to repeat those same errors in the future.

But if the motive behind the War on Drugs is not drug prevention or security, but the justification of U.S. political intervention throughout the region, then perhaps, for its proponents, it is not a failure at all. This is, in fact, what Coke's extradition suggests. For if the strategy were about narcotics, U.S. policy would not continue to prioritize the extradition of individual traffickers, which history shows will not reduce drug flow. If it were about security, then the killings of more than 73 civilians, the emotional and structural trauma suffered by the poorest community of Kingston, and the upheaval of Jamaican politics would indicate the operation's failure. Instead, U.S. authorities praised their Jamaican counterparts for a job well done. American counternarcotics policy, by this rendering, has little to do with drugs or security at all. Instead, the extradition of Christopher Coke demonstrated that the War on Drugs perpetuates a pattern that has long characterized U.S. foreign policy, a pattern in which the purported goal—security—contradicts its violent consequences, and whose means—economic and political hegemony—undermine the sovereignty of foreign democracies.

SOURCES

Auyero, Javier. "The Hyper-Shantytown: Ethnographic Portraits of Neo-liberal Violence(s)." *Ethnography.* July 2000: 93-116.

Black, Stephanie. *Life and Debt: A Film by Stephanie Black*. Tuff Gong Pictures, 2001.

Courtwright, David T. *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World.* Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 2001.

de Soto, Hernando. *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.* New York: Harper & Row, 1989.

Global Commission on Drug Policy. "War on Drugs," June 2011.

Governor General of Jamaica. "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Extradition Request for Christopher Coke," June 2011.

Gray, Obika. *Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica.* Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2004.

Gray, Sherrian. "Trends in Urban Crime and Violence in Kingston, Jamaica." Prepared for Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements 2007. UN-HABITAT, 2007.

Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd. *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

Gunst, Laurie. *Born Fi' Dead: A Journey Through the Jamaican Posse Underworld.* New York: Holt, 1995.

Habermas, Jürgen. *Legitimation Crisis.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

Human Rights Watch. "Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico's 'War on Drugs,'" November 2011.

Jamaicans for Justice and the International Human Rights Clinic of The George Washington University Law School. "The State of Human Rights in Jamaica Since the State of Emergency 2010," March 2011. Prepared for submission to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Jones, Marlyn J. "Policy Paradox: Consequences of US Drug Control Policy For Jamaica." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.* July 2002: 117-133.

Karras, Alan. *Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.

Klein, Axel, et al., eds. *Caribbean Drugs: From Criminalization to Harm Reduction*. London: Zed, 2004.

Melville, Juliet A. "The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Poor," Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Seventh Annual Development Conference, 2002.

Molano, Alfredo. *Loyal Soldiers in the Cocaine Kingdom: Tales of Drugs, Mules, and Gunmen.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Perlman, Janice. "The Metamorphosis of Marginality: Four Generations in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. July 2006: 154-177.

Portes, Alejandro and Kelly Hoffman. "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era." *Latin American Research Review.* 38(1) 2003: 41-82.

Roy, Ananya and Nezar AlSayyad, eds., *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia.* Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004.

Seelke, Clare Ribando, et al., "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs." Congressional Research Service, May 2011.

Sives, Amanda. "Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston Jamaica." *Latin American Perpectives.* 29(5) 2002: 66-89.

Snyder, Richard and Angelica Durán-Martínez. "Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-sponsored Protection Rackets." *Crime, Law and Social Change.* 52(3), 2009: 253-273.

Stone, Carl. *Class, State, and Democracy in Jamaica*. New York: Praeger, 1986.

Sullivan, Mark P. "Jamaica: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service, July 2010.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*. UN-HABITAT 2003.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2010." UNODC, September 2011.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "World Drug Report 2010." UNODC, 2010. Report compiled and published annually.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "World Drug Report 2011," UNODC, 2010.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean," March 2007.

United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control," March 2010. Report compiled and published annually.

United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control," March 2011.

United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "Fiscal Year 2010 Program and Budget Guide."

Wacquant, Loic. "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on its Nature and Implications." *Acta Sociologica*. 39(2), 1996: 121-139.

Yashar, Deborah. "Institutions and Citizenship: Reflections on the Illicit." IAS Conference on Contesting Liberal Citizenship, Hebrew University, July 2009. From revised copy, September 2010.

Youngers, Coletta A. and Eileen Rosin, eds. *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact Of U.S. Policy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner/WOLA, 2004.

CHAPTER NOTES

Timeline

[1] Case summary from the U.S. Southern District Court of New York.
[2] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, p. 52.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., p.50.
[5] U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) press release, "Manhattan Attorney Charges Jamaica-Based Drug Kingpin with Narcotics and Firearms Trafficking Crimes," Aug. 28, 2009.
[6] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Foreign Minister warns that prospective arrest of powerful 'Don' could ignite civil unrest, but assures government will meet obligations under extradition treaty," Sept. 11, 2009. Released, as all classified cables cited here, by Wikileaks.
[7] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Dip note received on Sept. 18, 2009," Sept. 19, 2009.
[8] Bruce Golding's statement to Parliament, May 11, 2010. Full text on GOJ website: http://www.opm.gov.jm/news_and_public_affairs/speeches/hon_bruce_golding_prime_ministeron_the_extradition_of_christopher_c
[9] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Dip note received on October 30, 2009," Nov. 2, 2009.
[10] Ibid.
[11] "Golding will not discuss 'Dudus.'" Edmond Campbell, *Jamaica Gleaner,* Dec. 9, 2009.
[12] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "PM laments law enforcement primacy in USG relationship, hints at Coke extradition refusal." Jan. 1, 2010.
[13] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Jamaica: Coke extradition case; IMF agreement." Feb. 10, 2010.
[14] U.S. State Department, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).
[15] Bruce Golding's statement to Parliament, May 11, 2010.
[16] Bruce Golding's speech to the nation, May 17, 2010. Full text on *Jamaica Gleaner* website: http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=19376
[17] "Arrest Dudus." Gary Spaulding, *Jamaica Gleaner*, May 19, 2010.
[18] "Attack on state—Police stations set ablaze, cop shot, civilian slain." *Jamaica Gleaner,* May 24, 2010.
[19] Bruce Golding's speech to the nation, May 23, 2010. Full text on *Jamaica Gleaner* website: http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=19526
[20] "Deadly Dudus Raid." Arthur Hall, *Jamaica Gleaner,* May 28, 2010.
[21] "73 Killed in West Kingston." *Jamaica Observer*, May 27, 2010.
[22] "Market Blues." Lovelette Brooks, *Jamaica Gleaner,* May 29, 2010.
[23] "Preserve crime scenes—Witter." Mark Beckford, *Jamaica Gleaner,* June 4, 2010.
[24] "St. Catherine awakens to state of emergency." Edmond Campbell, *Jamaica Gleaner*, June 23, 2010.
[25] "House passes six anti-crime bills." Alicia Dunkley, *Jamaica Observer,* June 23, 2010.
[26] "We've got him!" Gary Spaulding, *Jamaica Gleaner,* June 23, 2010.
[27] U.S. DEA press release, "Christopher Michael Coke Arrives in United States to Face Narcotics and Firearm Trafficking Charges in Manhattan Federal Court," June 25, 2010.
[28] "'Too much at stake,'" *Jamaica Gleaner,* July 22, 2010.
[29] "Jamaican kingpin pleads guilty in New York." Joseph Goldstein, *New York Times*, August 31, 2011.
[30] Bruce Golding's national address, October 2, 2011. Full transcript on GOJ website: http://www.jis.gov.jm/news/leads-117/28910
[31] U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, files for the case of US v Gray et al.

Chapter 1: Introduction

[32] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "World Drug Report 2010" p. 173.
[33] David Courtwright, p. 165.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Axel Klein, et al., p. 13.
[36] Alan Karras, p. 17.
[37] Deborah Yashar, p. 22.
[38] Ibid., p. 89.
[39] Ibid.
[40] For drug mule narratives, see Alfredo Molano.
[41] Marlyn Jones, p. 118.
[42] PBS Frontline, "Thirty Years of America's Drug War: A Chronology," reports that Nixon declared a "war on drugs" a month after an explosive Congressional report documented the growing heroin epidemic among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. On the PBS website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/. See also, "Nixon's 'war on drugs' began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging." Ed Vulliami, *The Guardian*, July 23, 2011. The article references The *Guardian*'s coverage the day after Nixon's 1971 declaration, which included a report from the Mekong Delta about drug use among U.S. soldiers there.
[43] Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," in Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*.
[44] Clare Seelke et al., p. 9.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ivelaw Griffith, p. 34.
[47] Rachel Neild, "U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies" in Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy*, p. 64.
[48] See Isacson and Neild.
[49] Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Gerardo Cordero, "The Caribbean: The 'Third Border' and the War on Drugs," in Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy*, p. 304.
[50] Michael Platzer, et al. "Illicit Drug Markets in the Caribbean: Analysis of Information on Drug Flows Through the Region," in Klein et al., *Caribbean Drugs*, p. 216.
[51] Beruff and Cordero, "The Caribbean: The 'Third Border,'" in Youngers and Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy*, p. 313.
[52] Ibid., p. 319.
[53] Michael Platzer, et al., "Illicit Drug Markets in the Caribbean: Analysis of Information on Drug Flows Through the Region," in Klein et al., *Caribbean Drugs: From Criminalization to Harm Reduction*, p. 216. Also see Isacson.
[54] Klein, "The Search for a New Drug Policy Framework: From the Barbados Plan of Action to the Ganja Commission," in Klein et al., *Caribbean Drugs*, p. 13.
[55] Neild in *Drugs and Democracy*, p. 76.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Platzer et al., in *Caribbean Drugs.* p. 220.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Klein in *Caribbean Drugs,* p. 26.
[60] Vice Admiral Hardley Lewin, head of the JDF in 2003, quoted by Beruff and Cordero in *Drugs and Democracy,* p. 309.
[61] See Javier Auyero on Buenos Aires, Hernando de Soto on Lima, and Janice Perlman on Rio de Janeiro.

[62] Nezar AlSayyad, "Urban Informality as a 'New' Way of Life," in Roy and AlSayyad, *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia,* p. 26.
[63] See Carl Stone and Stephanie Black.
[64] Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman.
[65] Klein in *Caribbean Drugs*, p. 26.
[66] Obika Gray, p. 287.
[67] Richard Snyder and Angelica Durán-Martínez, p. 1.
[68] See, for instance, the UNODC's "World Drug Report 2010," p. 232.
[69] "Juan Manuel Santos: 'It is time to think again about the war on drugs." John Mullholland, *The Guardian*, November 12, 2011.
[70] "Thinking the Unthinkable." *The Economist,* August 12, 2010.
[71] Global Commission on Drug Policy, "War on Drugs."
[72] "Call off the global drug war." Jimmy Carter, *New York Times*, June 16, 2011.
[73] "Poll: Mexicans think cartels are winning drug war." *McClatchy Newspapers*, March 29, 2011.
[74] "U.S. can't justify its drug war spending, reports say." Brian Bennett, *Los Angeles Times,* June 9, 2011.
[75] Isacson in *Drugs and Democracy*, p. 36.

Chapter 2: Jamaica on the Drug Map

[77] President Barack Obama, opening address at the Summit of the Americas, April 17, 2009. Full text: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Summit-of-the-Americas-Opening-Ceremony
[77] UNODC and World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean," p. i.
[78] Ibid., p. iii.
[79] "Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368," Ronald Reagan, June 24, 1982. From online archive, "The American Presidency Project" of UC Santa Barbara: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42671#axzz1dkq723Nx
[80] Seelke et al., p. 10.
[81] UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010," p. 66.
[82] U.S. State Department, 2011 INCSR.
[83] Adam Isacson's analysis of 2011 cocaine production figures released by the UNODC and U.S. State Department on the Just the Facts blog of the Washington Office on Latin America, Oct. 5, 2011, which finds that U.S. government cocaine production estimates show an increase in production in Peru, a decrease in Colombia, and stagnancy in Bolivia, resulting in no total change between 2008 and 2009. Analysis and chart here: http://justf.org/blog/2011/10/05/updated-coca-cultivation-estimates
[84] UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010," p. 235.
[85] UNODC and World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development," p. 16.
[86] UNODC, "Global Study on Homicide," p. 51.
[87] UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010," p. 235.
[88] Jamaica's 2009 cocaine seizure data is from the U.S. State Department's 2011 INCSR; U.S. street value is based on the 2009 DEA data of $174 per gram of cocaine from the U.S. Department of Justice's "National Drug Threat Assessment 2010"; according to the U.S. State Department's country report, Jamaican exports to the U.S. totaled $335 million in 2010.

[89] Interview with author, July 2010.
[90] UNODC homicide statistics for 2010, released with the "Global Study on Homicide." Cote d'Ivoire, with the fourth-highest homicide rate, is the exception.
[91] UNODC and World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development," p. iii.
[92] U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Jamaica fact sheet, May 7, 2011: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/141703.htm
[93] U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Indictment of United States of America v. Christopher Coke, unsealed on August 28, 2009.
[94] See Gunst for anecdotes of Jamaican posses purchasing guns from rogue officers.
[95] Author's observations in Kingston garrison communities between 2006-2009.
[96] UNODC, "Global Study on Homicide," p. 11.
[97] Ibid. p. 51.
[98] Beruff and Cordero in *Drugs and Democracy,* p. 311.
[99] UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010," p. 16.
[100] According to the Caribbean Community Secretariat Regional Statistics of 2009 (the most recent available data), CARICOM's gross domestic product totaled $38.5 billion.
[101] U.S. House of Representatives, "Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Security from Southwest Asia, Latin America, and West Africa." Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2009.
[102] Jamaica Information Service, "JCF bars over 100 members for corrupt practices." March 16, 2010.
[103] Griffith, p. 143.
[104] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[105] Ibid.
[106] U.S.-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, letter of transmittal from White House to Senate, 1984.
[107] Jamaica Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, letter of transmittal from White House to Senate, 1991.
[108] U.S. Department of State, "Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 and other international programs, FY 2012," pp. 98-100.
[109] Quoted by Klein in *Caribbean Drugs*, p. 25.
[110] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, FY2010 Budget Guide.
[111] "Database of U.S. Institutions that Trained Personell from Jamaica," compiled on the Washington Office on Latin America's Just the Facts website, justf.org.
[112] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[113] Analysis of arms and equipment sold or authorized for commercial sale to Jamaica by the Washington Office on Latin America, on justf.org.
[114] U.S. State Department, Foreign Operations Congressional budget justification, FY 2010.
[115] Klein in *Caribbean Drugs,* p. 34.
[116] National Commission on Ganja, "Report of the National Commission on Ganja," August 2001.
[117] "NCDA, MAJ supports ganja decriminalization." *Jamaica Gleaner*, August 18, 2001.
[118] "US backlash against ganja—Embassy official warns of decertification for Jamaica." David Williams, *Jamaica Gleaner,* August 17, 2001.
[119] "Ganja to remain under ban in Jamaica because of Int'l treaties." Phillip Hamilton, *Jamaica Gleaner*, January 31, 2011, reporting the opinion of Dr. Wendel Abel of the University of the West Indies.
[120] Beruff and Cordero in *Drugs and Democracy,* p. 323.

[121] Seelke et al., p. 9.
[122] Griffith, p. 137.
[123] "The cocaine connection." Don Robotham, *Jamaica Gleaner*, July 17, 2001.

Chapter 3: An Extradition Request & a Long Delay

[124] U.S. DEA press release, "Manhattan U.S. Attorney charges Jamaica-based drug kingpin with narcotics and firearms trafficking crimes," Aug. 28, 2009.
[125] U.S. DEA, "Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)" website home page: http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm.
[126] U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, files for the case of US v Gray et al.
[127] First-person accounts of the actions of top government officials before and after the extradition request for Coke was served were revealed in testimony during proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry, January through June 2011, and covered in local newspapers.
[128] "Government was nervous – Feared 'Dudus' extradition request could topple administration." Paul Henry, *Jamaica Gleaner*, Feb. 5, 2011.
[129] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Dip note received on Sept. 18, 2009," Sept. 19, 2009.
[130] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Dip note received on October 30, 2009," Nov. 2, 2009.
[131] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[132] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, ""Extradition Jamaica: Christopher Michael Coke," Dec. 3, 2009.
[133] "'Red Herring' Retired commish defends cop in extradition saga." Arthur Hall, *Jamaica Gleaner*, May 22, 2010.
[134] Ibid.
[135] "'Lightbourne had no concerns about earlier extradition cases.'" Gary Spaulding, *Jamaica Gleaner,* Feb. 2, 2011.
[136] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "U.S. request to extradite powerful 'don' presents government with a dangerous dilemma; Kingston Mayor warns of 'severe repercussions,'" Sept.2, 2009.
[137] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Fiscal crisis threatens monetary stability," Jan. 14, 2010.
[138] "Jamaica PM admits role against US drug extradition." Mike Melia, *The Guardian,* May 13, 2010.
[139] Golding's testimony at the Commission of Enquiry, reported in "Coke had 'Don' Status." Gary Spaulding, *Jamaica Gleaner,* March 19, 2011.
[140] Golding's testimony at the Commission of Enquiry, summarized in the commission's final report.
[141] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "U.S. Request to extradite powerful 'don' presents government with a dangerous dilemma; Kingston Mayor warns of 'severe repercussions,'" Sept.2, 2009.
[142] "Golding Will Not Discuss 'Dudus.'" Edmond Campbell, *Jamaica Gleaner,* Dec.9, 2009. Text and reader comments: http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20091209/lead/lead5.html
[143] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[144] Snyder and Durán-Martínez.
[145] "Gun battle in Tivoli-Five killed; Policeman, soldier injured; Nine weapons found." Howard Campbell, *Jamaica Gleaner*, Jan. 14, 2008.
[146] "Dorothy's Defense." Gary Spaulding, *Jamaica Gleaner*, March 4, 2011.
[147] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, p. 44.
[148] Bruce Golding's address to the nation, May 17, 2010.

Chapter 4: The West Kingston Incursion

[149] Quoted in "'Dudus' Panic." Arthur Hall, *Jamaica Gleaner* May 18, 2010.
[150] Ibid.
[151] "Photo Gallery: Tivoli Gardens Roadblocks," *Jamaica Observer,* May 18, 2010.
[152] Interviews by the author with several West Kingston residents in June 2010.
[153] "Attack on State—Police Stations Set Ablaze Cop Shot, Civilian Slain." *Jamaica Gleaner,* May 24, 2010.
[154] UN-HABITAT, *The Challenge of Slums*, p. 6.
[155] "The Mother of All Garrisons." Peter Espeut, *Jamaica Gleaner,* October 12, 2005.
[156] In author interviews, residents of Tivoli Gardens and Denham Town recounted a feeling of safety that prevailed under the authority of Coke and the Shower Posse.
[157] UNODC and World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development," p. 111.
[158] Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), "Reform Matters: Quarterly e-Brief on Justice Reform," April-June 2009.
[159] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), "Preliminary Observations on the Commission's Visit to Jamaica," December 5, 2008.
[160] Interview by the author at the public defender's office, August 2010.
[161] Classified U.S. Embassy cable, "Cops acquitted in murder charges in Braeton 7," Feb. 18, 2005.
[162] See, for example, the IACHR's "Preliminary Observations on the Commission's Visit to Jamaica," and the JFJ and George Washington University Law School report, "The State of Human Rights in Jamaica since the State of Emergency 2010."
[163] Headline in the *Jamaica Observer,* Oct. 28, 2011.
[164] Interview by the author in JFJ offices, August 2010.
[165] IACHR, "Preliminary Observations," p. 2.
[166] Interview by the author in the resident's West Kingston apartment, June 2010.
[167] Full text of speech: http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=19526
[168] "Fierce Gunfights Rattle Kingston," *Jamaica Gleaner* May 25, 2010.
[169] "Witter Laments Human-Rights Abuse," Phillip Hamilton, *Jamaica Gleaner,* Jan. 31, 2011.
[170] Interview by the author.
[171] Interview by the author at the Tivoli Gardens Community Center, June 3, 2010.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Accounts of the destruction of the home are from first-hand observations by the author, who visited it the following week.
[174] JFJ and George Washington University Law School, "The State of Human Rights in Jamaica Since the State of Emergency 2010," p. 3.
[175]Bruce Golding's address to the nation May 23, 2010.
[176] JFJ and George Washington University Law School, p. 3.
[177] "PNP Shoots Down State of Emergency," *Jamaica Observer*, July 21 2010.
[178] JFJ and George Washington University Law School, p. 3.

Chapter 5: Epilogue

[179] "Jamaican druglord Christopher 'Dudus' Coke arrested," *The Telegraph,* June 23, 2010.
[180] U.S. DEA press release, "Christopher Michael Coke Arrives in United States to Face Narcotics and Firearms Trafficking Charges in Manhattan Federal Court," June 25, 2010.

[181] Amnesty International press release, "Jamaica Violence Investigation Must Be Thorough," May 27, 2010.
[182] IACHR press release, "IACHR Concerned About Violence in Jamaica," May 27, 2010.
[183] Interview by the author.
[184] Bruce Golding's national address, July 21, 2010. Full transcript: http://www.opm.gov.jm/news_and_public_affairs/national_broadcast_july_21_2010
[185] "Editorial: Security Forces Must Declare on Tivoli," *Jamaica Gleaner,* March 14, 2011.
[186] Interview by the author.
[187] Jamaica Information Service, "Reduction in major crimes in 2010," Jan. 5, 2010.
[188] OAS, "Kingston Metropolitan Area Seismic Hazard Assessment," 2001. Due to a paucity of census data in Jamaica, estimates of the population of the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) and its share of the country's population vary widely, from ¼ to more than half.
[189] Sherrian Gray, "Trends in Urban Crime and Violence in Kingston, Jamaica," p. 3.
[190] JFJ press release, "One in five killings in Jamaica committed by security force," Jan. 13, 2011.
[191] "PNP renews call for enquiry into Mannat Affair [sic]," *RJR News,* Aug. 22, 2010.
[192] "The Manatt Emails," *Jamaica Gleaner*, August 24, 2010.
[193] "Coke/Manatt Enquiry Coming," *RJR News,* October 12, 2010.
[194] "PNP, JLP square off over Dudus again," Daraine Luton, *Jamaica Gleaner,* Nov. 24, 2010.
[195] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, p. 53.
[196] Bruce Golding's national address, October 2, 2011. Full transcript: http://www.jis.gov.jm/news/leads-117/28910
[197] Isacson in *Drugs and Democracy,* p. 27.
[198] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[199] U.S. DEA press release, "Christopher Michael Coke Arrives in United States to Face Narcotics and Firearms Trafficking Charges in Manhattan Federal Court," June 25, 2010.
[200] Ibid.
[201] U.S. State Department, 2011 INCSR.
[202] Isacson in *Drugs and Democracy,* p. 27.
[203] Mark Sullivan, "Jamaica: Background and U.S. Relations," p. i.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

[204] Seelke et al., p. i.
[205] UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010," p. 93.
[206] President Barack Obama, opening address at the Summit of the Americas, April 17, 2009.
[207] UNODC and World Bank "Crime, Violence, and Development," p. ix.
[208] U.S. State Department, 2010 INCSR.
[209] Organization of American States (OAS), Status of ratification of Multilateral treaty A-63 by OAS states, on the OAS website: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-63.html
[210] "Prospects dim for Mexican firearms treaty," Stephen Dinan, *Washington Times,* Aug. 9, 2009.
[211] Seelke et al., p. i.
[212] U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, "New information about Counternarcotics Contracts in Latin America," 2011.
[213] U.S. Rep. Eliot Engel's press release, "Western Hemisphere subcommittee adopts Engel bill to create drug policy commission," Oct. 15, 2009.

[214] U.S. State Department, FY 2011 Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 and Other International Programs.

[215] This goal is expressed in the States Dept.'s CBSI fact sheet on the department's website: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/142088.htm

[216] Congressional Research Service, "Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy," February 2010.

[217] U.S. State Department, CBSI fact sheet.

[218] See Klein in *Caribbean Drugs* for a discussion of the need for a "development-oriented" approach to combat drug trafficking.

[219] Federal News Service, "Joint Hearing of the Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee and the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee." May 27, 2010.

[220] U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget Guide for FY 2010.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Seelke et al., chart on page 10.